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THE  ECONOMIES  of eastern Europe and the former Soviet  Union  (FSU) 
escaped communism  with a heavy burden. When central planning col- 
lapsed,  they  continued  to  suffer from widespread  political  control  of 
economic  activity.  Such politicization  had to be reduced significantly 
for small business formation and growth to begin. In recent years, some 
of these countries have succeeded  much better than others in replacing 
political  control  with  functioning  market institutions.  As  this  paper 
shows,  they  are also  the countries  that have had the healthiest  public 
finances,  the  smallest  unofficial  economies,  and the  best  records  of 
growth. 
The politicization  of economic  life can usefully  be thought of as the 
exercise by politicians  of control rights over business. ' Such rights may 
include regulatory powers over privatized and private firms, the ability 
to regulate and restrict entry, control over the use of land and real estate 
that private businesses  occupy,  the determination and collection  of taxes 
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on businesses,  the right to inspect  firms and close  them if regulations 
are violated,  control  over  international  trade and foreign  exchange 
transactions, and in some cases,  even the power to set prices. Typically, 
politicians  use these rights to pursue their own interests,  such as main- 
taining employment  in certain firms, supporting politically  friendly and 
punishing  politically  unfriendly  entrepreneurs,  and subsidizing  their 
allies.2 Politicians  also use these rights to enrich themselves  by offering 
firms relief  from regulation  in exchange  for bribes.3 Political  control 
generally  reduces the profitability of doing business,  and therefore ad- 
versely  influences  entrepreneurial activity  and economic  growth.4 
During  the  transition  from communism  to  capitalism,  the  adverse 
effects  of  political  control  on  growth  are manifested  in a number of 
ways.  Most  directly,  when  profits or potential  profits are taken away 
from firms through regulation,  taxation,  or corruption,  entrepreneurs 
choose  not to start firms or expand less rapidly than they might other- 
wise.  But entrepreneurs have another option,  namely,  to operate unof- 
ficially.5 In many transition economies,  a consequence  of politicization 
has been the growth of the unofficial economy,  in which firms can avoid 
taxes  and regulations,  though probably not bribes.  Firms that operate 
unofficially  use  protection  and other  "public"  services  supplied  by 
private-including  criminal-organizations.  In this  paper,  we  show 
that the politicization  of economic  life and the resulting reallocation of 
resources  to  the  unofficial  sector  have  profound  effects  on  both  the 
structure and the growth rate of a transition economy. 
Specifically,  we  show  that the  movement  of  production  into  the 
unofficial  economy  has  significant  consequences  for  public  finance. 
Since  firms in the unofficial  sector largely escape  taxation,  the reallo- 
cation  of  resources  into  that sector  undermines  tax  collections,  and 
consequently  the ability of the government to provide public goods  in 
the official  sector.  Such public goods  include law and order, effective 
tax and regulatory institutions,  and relatively  uncorrupt public admin- 
istration. The lack of provision of such market-supporting public goods 
makes operating in the official  sector even less  attractive to firms, and 
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can set off the collapse  of public finances as more and more firms escape 
into the unofficial  economy. 
Economies  find themselves  in either of two very different equilibria. 
In the first, tax distortions  and regulations  are low,  government  reve- 
nues  are high,  the provision  of  public  goods  in the official  sector  is 
sufficient,  and therefore  the unofficial  sector  is  small.  In the  second 
equilibrium,  in the official  sector taxes and regulations are prohibitive, 
public  finances  are precarious,  public  goods  provision  is  inadequate, 
and as a consequence,  much of the economic  activity  is concentrated 
in the unofficial  sector.  If firms are more productive in the official  than 
in the unofficial sector, the second equilibrium is associated with worse 
aggregate performance than the first. 
Our work can be thought of as complementing  Olivier  Blanchard's 
analysis of transition economies,  which highlights  the creation of new 
private firms by entrepreneurs as the engine  of  growth.6 We focus  on 
the  political  and institutional  determinants of  the entrepreneurial re- 
sponse,  and in particular, on the allocation  of  resources  between  the 
official  and the unofficial  sectors.  We are not the first to stress the role 
of depoliticization  in transition or the importance of building market- 
supporting rather than market-distorting institutions.7 In this tradition, 
our paper focuses  on the implications  of excessive  regulation and tax- 
ation for the government's  budget and for the provision of public goods 
required by a market economy. 
Empirical analysis of the determinants of growth in transition econ- 
omies  has largely  focused  on the effects  of  stabilization.8  Several  of 
these  studies  also recognize  the importance of depoliticization  and in- 
stitution-building  for the efficiency  of the economy,  and therefore for 
growth.9 We elaborate on the existing  literature in three distinct ways. 
First,  we  describe  the role of  the unofficial  economy  in transition 
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and measure its size. '0 The unofficial economy does not receive enough 
attention in recent studies of reform. Neither the World Bank,  nor the 
European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (EBRD),  nor the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) offers  systematic  estimates  of the 
unofficial  economy."  Norman  Loayza  presents  an  early  theoretical 
analysis  of the unofficial  economy  and applies it to the analysis  of the 
Latin American  experience.'2  Loayza  does  not measure the unofficial 
economy,  as we do below. 
Second,  we  emphasize  the  public  finance  aspects  of  transition by 
focusing  our empirical  analysis  on  the consequences  for the govern- 
ment's  budget of  the escape  of  new  firms from the official  economy, 
and on the provision  of potentially  beneficial  public goods.  '  Law and 
order is one key public good that can be measured empirically  in tran- 
sition  economies,  but we  are more broadly interested in the financing 
of a range of market-supporting institutions,  including regulatory agen- 
cies,  a reasonably honest public administration, and so forth. We look 
at the relationship between taxes and regulations,  government budgets, 
and the provision  of  public  goods,  and examine  the consequences  of 
the condition  of  public  finances  for both the unofficial  economy  and 
economic  growth. 'I 
Third, we revisit the evidence  on the beneficial  effects  of stabiliza- 
tion  on  growth.  Since  most  countries  that stabilized  early  have  also 
implemented  widespread  deregulation,  it is difficult  to ascertain from 
the available data whether stabilization by itself has a direct benefit for 
growth by itself,  or needs  to be combined  with other elements  of  de- 
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politicization  and institution-building.  The positive effects  on entrepre- 
neurship  of  stabilization  and liberalization  combined  are now  well 
established.'5  However,  recent evidence-in  particular, from Russia, 
where,  in  contrast  with  eastern  Europe,  stabilization  has  advanced 
ahead of depoliticization-suggests  that stabilization  is at best not the 
whole  story behind growth. 6  Our analysis  suggests  that stabilization 
may,  indeed,  not be sufficient  for the resumption of growth,  and that 
the building of market-supporting institutions is a separate and crucial 
requirement of  a successful  transition.  The EBRD's  1997  Transition 
Report takes this point of view  as well. 
In the next three sections  of  the paper we present a simple  model, 
describe  our data,  and present the evidence  on the effects  of political 
control  on the unofficial  economy.  The following  section  focuses  on 
the determinants of  growth.  The next section  revisits  the data on sta- 
bilization.  The paper concludes  with a discussion  of the reform agenda 
of countries in the former Soviet  Union,  as suggested  by our empirical 
findings. 
A Simple Model 
Our model captures, in the starkest way, some of the ideas described 
above.  We consider the allocation of labor between the official  and the 
unofficial  sectors  of  the economy.  The government  imposes  taxes  on 
the official  sector  and provides  public  goods  from the tax revenues. 
These public goods,  such as law and order, increase the productivity of 
firms in the official  sector.  The unofficial  sector does  not pay official 
taxes,  but neither does  it have access  to the public goods  provided by 
the government.  Instead,  it pays fees  to private protection agencies  to 
provide some public goods,  such as protection from thieves and contract 
enforcement.  1'  The quality of that protection depends on the revenues 
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raised  by  the  private  agencies.  We  examine  the  allocation  of  labor 
between  the two sectors and its implications  for tax revenues,  law and 
order, and the efficiency  of the economy. 
Denote  by t the generalized  tax rate on output in the official  sector. 
The generalized  tax rate includes  taxation,  regulation,  and corruption 
(that is,  bribes).  Taxes  raise revenue for the government,  but some of 
the generalized  taxes,  such as regulation and bribes,  do not. For now, 
let t be the share of output that the government in various ways removes 
from each  firm in the official  sector  and obtains for its budget.  Let s 
denote the corresponding  generalized  tax rate in the unofficial  sector, 
charged by the private enforcers of law and order, to whom we loosely 
refer as the mafia. Analogous  to the official  sector,  collections  from s 
enter the mafia's budget. 
Let T be the tax revenue in the official  sector,  and S the tax revenue 
in the unofficial  sector.  Let Q be the quantity of the public good,  such 
as  law  and order,  in the official  sector,  and R be  the corresponding 
quantity in the unofficial sector. Here Q captures the public goods from 
which firms operating unofficially  can be excluded.  For instance,  firms 
in the unofficial  sector do not have access  to police,  courts, or admin- 
istrative assistance  from the government.  In contrast,  such public ser- 
vices  as roads,  healthcare,  and education  are accessible  to all  firms, 
even  those  in  the  unofficial  sector,  and hence  Q  does  not  properly 
capture these goods. 
Let L be the aggregate labor force,  and let the wage rate be normal- 
ized to 1. Finally,  let F and I be the subscripts denoting the official  and 
the unofficial  sectors,  respectively;  so that LF and L, denote the labor 
employed,  HF and  fI,  the  after-tax  profits,  and  YF and  Y, the  output  in 
each sector. 
Consider the official sector first. The production function is assumed 
to be given  by 
(1)  YF  =  QLF, 
so that the quantity of the public good directly enhances the productivity 
of the official  sector.  As a consequence,  after-tax profits are given  by 
(2)  IF  (1  -t)QLF  -LF- 
The tax revenue,  T, is given  by T =  tQLF.  We assume that the supply 
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Q(T),  with Q'  >  0 and Q" <  0.  This does  not mean that government 
resources are spent entirely on the provision of public goods; indeed,  a 
large portion might be stolen  or wasted.  We only  assume that at least 
some  share of the marginal dollar is spent on public goods. 
This assumption raises an important substantive point,  namely,  that 
the cost  of providing  market-supporting public institutions  may be so 
low  that even  a nearly bankrupt government could afford an adequate 
level of provision.  Our assumption that a decline in government revenue 
leads to a deterioration in the supply of  public goods  may,  therefore, 
miss  the mark. Indeed,  in the Russian  federal budget for  1995,  only 
about  10 percent of  the expenditure  was,  by its own  definition,  dedi- 
cated to "law and order."  Nevertheless,  we believe  that our assumption 
is  appropriate  because,  despite  their  enormous  benefits,  market- 
supporting public goods are often among the first to be cut in a transition 
economy  when the budget deteriorates. In such a situation, the govern- 
ment is typically  weak, disorganized,  and torn in a variety of directions 
by powerful  lobbies  who apply pressure to maintain the level  of much 
less  socially  useful  expenditures,  such  as  agricultural and industrial 
subsidies  and defense  spending.  In contrast, expenditures on the essen- 
tial  and more  purely  public  goods,  such  as  law  and order,  science, 
healthcare,  and education,  suffer. 
Importantly, we also assume that the government does not spend any 
of its tax revenue to fight the mafia or to restrict the movement of firms 
into the unofficial  sector.  The government  and the mafia compete  for 
business-and  therefore for the revenue  base-through  the combina- 
tions  of  tax rates and public  goods  that they offer  in their respective 
sectors. 
From the government's budget constraint, one obtains Q =  Q(tQLF). 
Eliminating  Q from the right-hand side,  we  write Q  =  q(tLF). For q 
expressed only as a function of tLF,  it is easy to verify that q' >  0 and, 
in some cases,  q" >  0. This is the first possible  increasing return in our 
model: as public good provision  increases,  so does the productivity of 
the private sector and the tax revenues that it furnishes,  which finances 
a further increase  in public  good  provision.  The q function  exhibits 
increasing returns if the government  is sufficiently  productive at con- 
verting revenues  into public  goods.  For example,  if  Q(T)  =  To and 
(x >  1/2, then q" >  0. 
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Figure 1. The Unofficial  Economy  and the Collapse  of Public Finances 
Tax  revenue  and  public  goods (T and  Q) 
Good  equilibrium  (U = 0) 
,/ 
Tax  collection  (and  public  goods)  function 
Unstable  equilibrium 
Firm  mobility  function 
Bad equilibrium 
(U=  1) 
0  1 
Unofficial  economy  share  (U) 
Source:  Authors'  model, as described  in text. 
collects  taxes  from firms in the unofficial  sector  and produces  public 
goods  for the firms it protects.  For the unofficial  sector,  R  =  r(sL,), 
where r' >  0 and, under some conditions,  r" >  0. We do not, however, 
focus  on these particular increasing returns in either the official  or the 
unofficial  sector because  it seems implausible that the marginal expen- 
diture from the budget  on market-supporting public  institutions  is  so 
high. 
Figure  1 presents  the  equilibria  in the model.  In equilibrium,  the 
labor market clears,  so  that L,  +  LF  =  L.  The figure graphs the tax 
revenue  and quality of public goods  against the share of the unofficial 
economy.  The  solid  line  shows  that the  higher  is  the  share  of  the 
unofficial economy,  the lower are the official tax collections,  and hence 
the supply of public goods  to the official  sector.  The dotted line-the 
firm mobility  function-shows  that the higher is the supply of public 
goods  in the official  economy,  the fewer  firms choose  to operate un- 
officially.  The dotted line generally  cuts the solid line from below. Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  167 
In general,  there are three equilibria in this model: one in which all 
resources  are concentrated  in the official  sector,  one  in which  all re- 
sources  are in  the  unofficial  sector,  and a knife-edge  equilibrium  in 
which the two sectors coexist.  The existence  of the extreme equilibria 
is independent of the possible  convexity  of the q and r functions; that 
is,  there is a second,  and totally  separate, source of increasing returns 
to sector size. 
When all resources are concentrated in the unofficial sector, govern- 
ment tax  collections  in  the  official  sector  are zero,  hence  so  is  the 
amount of  the public  good  supplied  in that sector,  as well  as its pro- 
ductivity.  As  a consequence,  all firms choose  to stay in the unofficial 
sector.  This  equilibrium  is  stable.  When  nearly  all  firms are in  the 
unofficial  sector,  government  revenues  do  not suffice  to  provide  the 
level of public goods needed to draw firms back into the official  sector; 
in fact,  more resources  move  to the unofficial  sector.  In figure 1, this 
equilibrium is stable because the dotted line is above the solid line when 
all,  or nearly all,  of the resources are in the unofficial  sector. 
Similarly,  if all resources are concentrated in the official  sector,  the 
tax revenues  and public good  provision  in that sector are high enough 
that all firms choose  to stay there.  The equilibrium  is  stable because 
when only a few firms are operating unofficially,  it is to the advantage 
of these firms to switch back and receive the public goods of the official 
sector.  In figure 1, the dotted line is below  the solid line when the size 
of the unofficial  sector is near zero. The forces causing the multiplicity 
of  equilibria  in this  model  are general,  and are closely  related to the 
idea of fiscal increasing returns of Blanchard and Lawrence Summers, 
even though more realistic  specifications  would generate less  extreme 
outcomes.  18 
To examine  the intermediate equilibrium,  we compute the profits of 
the marginal firm, which  is  indifferent  to being  in the official  or the 
unofficial  sector.  This  firm takes  aggregate  employment  in  the  two 
sectors,  LF and L,,  as given.  Its marginal profit in the official  sector is 
given  by  (1  -  t)q(tLF)  -  1,  and  its  marginal  profit  in  the  unofficial 
sector is (1  -s)r(sL,)  -  1. In equilibrium,  it must be that 
18. Blanchard  and Summers  (1987) present  a model in which an increase  in govern- 
ment spending  reduces unemployment,  raises the level of economic activity, and may 
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(3)  (1  -  t)q(tLF)  =  (1  -  s)r(sL,). 
For a given  set of tax rates t and s,  there generally  exist  LF and L, 
adding up to L that solve  equation  3.  However,  this  equilibrium  is 
unstable.  If,  starting from this equilibrium,  a firm tips over from the 
unofficial to the official  sector,  the resources of the official  sector rise, 
hence  so do tax collections  and the quantity of public goods  supplied 
and, finally, the productivity in that sector. More firms then switch into 
the official  sector,  and the intermediate equilibrium breaks down. 
Although  we  have  presented  a  static  model,  it  can  be  given  the 
"cobweb"  dynamic interpretation suggested  by the arrows in figure 1. 
Suppose that an economy-perhaps  for historical reasons or because of 
a good  budget  shock-ends  up on  the good  side  of  the intermediate 
equilibrium, that is, at a point where the unofficial economy is relatively 
small  and tax revenues  are relatively  large.  Firms that are operating 
unofficially  then  recognize  that the combination  of  taxes  and public 
goods  in the official  sector is attractive enough for them to switch.  As 
they move,  tax revenues  in the official  sector rise,  and hence  so does 
the provision of public goods in that sector. As this happens, more firms 
operating unofficially  switch,  and so on, until this virtuous cycle  leads 
to a fully official  economy.  Conversely,  suppose that an economy  ends 
up on  the bad side  of  the intermediate  equilibrium,  with  a relatively 
large unofficial  economy  and low  tax revenues.  Firms operating offi- 
cially  then recognize  that they are better off in the unofficial sector and 
move.  Their move  has a deleterious  effect  on the budget and the pro- 
vision  of public  goods  in the official  sector,  which causes  more firms 
to switch  to the unofficial  economy.  This vicious  cycle  ends up at the 
extreme equilibrium where the whole  economy  is unofficial. '9 
To interpret this model and its predictions,  it is useful to think of an 
augmented framework in which,  for reasons outside  the model,  some 
firms choose  to operate in the official  sector (for example,  state firms 
or firms dealing extensively  with the state) and others choose to operate 
in the unofficial  sector  (for example,  firms that infringe  on patents). 
In this  case,  the  forces  that we  describe  still  operate,  but both  sec- 
19. Costs of congestion in the unofficial  sector, suggested  by Loayza (1996), put a 
lower limit on the proportion  of the economy that remains  official. Evidence suggests 
that in the former Soviet Union this limit is low and has not yet been reached (see 
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tors  coexist  in  equilibrium.  What  does  the  analysis  say  about  such 
situations? 
The key prediction of the model is the potential separation of econ- 
omies  into two distinct  groups.  In one,  the government offers  a suffi- 
ciently  attractive  combination  of  tax  rates,  regulations,  and public 
goods that most firms choose to stay in the official sector. In this group, 
government revenues  suffice  to provide the public goods,  and the un- 
official  sector is small because  the government  outcompetes  it.  In the 
other group, the government does not offer firms a sufficiently attractive 
combination  of  tax rates,  regulations,  and public goods  to keep them 
operating officially,  and hence  many of  them end up in the large un- 
official  sector,  which  offers  a more attractive combination.  The gov- 
ernment budget in these countries does not suffice to offer more public 
goods,  and hence the unofficial  sector wins the competition  for firms. 
Our model  does  not  make  any immediate  predictions  as to  which 
equilibrium  is  associated  with higher output.  However,  if one  makes 
the auxiliary  but plausible  assumption  that the official  sector is  more 
productive at generating public goods,  then the overall performance of 
economies  with a small unofficial  sector is superior. There are several 
reasons why the government  may be more efficient  at converting  rev- 
enue into public  goods:  there are increasing  returns to the production 
of some goods,  such as defense  and laws; the government already has 
some  expertise  at producing  some  of  these  goods;  private  providers 
might not be  able  to commit  credibly  to  long-term  delivery  of  some 
services. 
These are the very stylized  predictions of a very stylized  model.  We 
evaluate  these  predictions  empirically  in the following  sections.  But 
first,  we  revisit  some  of  the  key  assumptions  responsible  for  these 
results,  in order  to  shed  light  on  the  theoretical  generality  of  the 
conclusions. 
Taxation,  Regulation,  and Corruption 
The results are driven by the assumption that excessive  taxes  force 
firms out of the official  sector.  Taxation itself,  however,  has an offset- 
ting benefit.  At least on the increasing part of the Laffer curve,  higher 
taxes raise more money for the government,  some of which is spent on 
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These are more detrimental to the official  sector than high taxes proper, 
since they bring all the distortionary effects but no government revenue. 
If we included regulation in the model,  the tendency toward bifurcation 
would  be  even  stronger  than  it  is  now.  In the  empirical  work,  we 
consider  both taxation and regulation. 
The effects  of corruption are somewhat different from those of tax- 
ation  and regulation.  Entrepreneurs generally  pay bribes precisely  to 
avoid  paying taxes  or following  regulations,  and therefore corruption 
reflects payments to evade government control.  In general,  the higher 
the level  of  taxation and regulation  (t),  the greater are the bribes that 
politicians  can extract from entrepreneurs in return for excusing  them 
from paying taxes or following  regulations.  Tax and regulatory burdens 
are therefore highly  correlated with the level  of corruption, which,  in 
turn, can serve  as a proxy for t.  Similar to regulation,  however,  cor- 
ruption does not raise any revenues for the government. 
Who Sets Tax Rates? 
In the model,  we do not set up decision  problems for the government 
and the  mafia,  and we  treat the tax rates t  and s  as parameters. The 
choice  of  these  parameters depends  on the nature of  competition  be- 
tween  the government  and the mafia, as well  as the nature of competi- 
tion inside the government (for example,  between different levels)  and 
inside  the mafia (for example,  between competing  groups).  If the gov- 
ernment has access to a superior technology  for producing public goods, 
it can always  outcompete  the mafia as long  as it can set t equal to s. 
The mafia may be at a further disadvantage if competing  private gangs 
independently  attempt to impose  taxes on the same businesses,  if the 
mafia cannot commit  not to expropriate capital ex post,  or if it cannot 
establish  a reputation for the consistent  provision of public goods  such 
as contract enforcement.  The government can also destroy the mafia, a 
point  to  which  we  return below.  In short,  the government  has many 
advantages,  which  lead  to  its  victory  in  most  well-functioning 
economies. 
In transition economies,  it is less  obvious  that the government  can 
always  offer  a better deal.  First, the government often spends a lot of 
its revenues on activities  other than the provision of public goods,  such 
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a result,  it might  have  a bigger  leakage  than the mafia.  Second,  the 
government  might,  for  socially  efficient  reasons,  choose  to  regulate 
more than the mafia does-for  example,  in regard to nuclear safety, 
pollution,  or other externalities.  Third,  and perhaps most  important, 
governments  in some transition economies  are disorganized  and not in 
control of themselves.  Consequently,  t is not set by one unified govern- 
ment,  but by  a collection  of  agencies  and levels  of  government  that 
impose  taxes,  bribes,  and  regulations  largely  independent  of  each 
other.20 In this way,  tax distortion in transition economies  can be a lot 
higher  than  is  optimal,  which  significantly  undermines  the  govern- 
ment's  tax  revenues,  and hence  its  ability  to  supply  public  goods. 
Moreover,  to the extent that the mafia sets s in response to an excessive 
level  of  t,  the  mafia can  adjust to  outcompete  the  government,  for 
example,  by setting s much lower than t. The bad equilibrium,  then, is 
a real possibility. 
Government Does  Not Restrict the Movement of Firms 
A key assumption in our model is that entrepreneurs are free to switch 
resources  from the official  to the unofficial  sector in seeking  a better 
mix of taxes and public goods.  But the government may be able to use 
political  repression to punish anyone who leaves  the official  sector.  It 
could use tax revenue to fight the mafia or, through raids and expropri- 
ation,  it could  directly  penalize  firms that are operating unofficially. 
Similarly,  if the government is itself  indistinguishable  from the mafia, 
it  may  be  able  to  impose  high  marginal  taxes  on  both  official  and 
unofficial activities.  A government that established itself as a successful 
repressive monopolist  would charge high taxes,  collect  substantial rev- 
enues,  and yet provide few public goods,  instead using the revenues to 
line its own pockets and to fuel the machinery of repression.  Although 
we do not model these possibilities  explicitly,  Belarus and Uzbekistan, 
both  highly  repressive  states,  appear to  be  outliers  in the  data.  The 
evidence  on Belarus  and Uzbekistan  is consistent  with the model of a 
repressive  monopoly  government  that collects  a lot of  taxes  but pro- 
duces few  public goods. 
20.  See Shleifer and Vishny (1993). 172  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Labor Supply 
One final assumption  that warrants comment  is that of  fixed  labor 
supply.  In our model,  entrepreneurs move between  sectors in search of 
the best combination  of  taxes  and public  goods.  Another response  to 
poor government performance is not to produce at all, or to produce in 
the household  sector,  which uses no public goods  and pays no taxes to 
either the government  or the mafia.  The introduction of  elastic  labor 
supply would strengthen our conclusion  about the bifurcation of econ- 
omies,  because  a government  offering  an unattractive combination  of 
taxes  and public  goods  would  see  its  tax base  further eroded  by  the 
withdrawal  of  labor supply.  The  introduction of  elastic  labor supply 
would also substantially strengthen our predictions concerning growth, 
since  bad combinations  of taxes and public goods  would now lead not 
only  to  the  reallocation  of  labor between  the  official  and unofficial 
economy,  but to  a first order reduction  in output,  as labor supply  is 
reduced. 
Summary 
Broadly  interpreted,  our model  has a number of  empirical  predic- 
tions.  It suggests  that in economies  where firms are free to move  be- 
tween  the official  and unofficial  sectors,  transition is likely  to follow 
one of two paths.  Some  countries would be characterized by low bur- 
dens from taxes,  regulation,  and corruption; relatively  high tax reve- 
nues;  large  quantities  of  public  goods  provided  by  the  government; 
small unofficial  sectors; and presumably-if  the official  sector is more 
efficient-high  growth rates.  Other countries  would  be characterized 
by high burdens from taxes,  regulation,  and corruption; low tax collec- 
tions;  small  quantities  of  public  goods  provided  by  the government; 
large unofficial sectors; and presumably, low growth rates. The adverse 
effect  of low  Q falls primarily on growth in the official  sector. 
In our empirical  work,  we try to obtain some estimates  of t and Q, 
as well  as of  the size  of  the official  and unofficial  sectors.  Next,  we 
examine  the relationship  between  t and Q, on the one  hand,  and the 
size of the unofficial  sector, on the other. We also examine the validity 
of  the public  finance mechanisms  operating in our model; that is,  the 
relationship between the tax and regulatory burden (t),  the budget (T), 
and the  supply  of  public  goods  (Q).  We  then  evaluate  the  model's Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  173 
implications  for the growth of  the official  sector and of  the economy 
overall. 
Data 
In this section  we discuss  our data sources and explain how we use 
the  available  information  to  develop  the  measures  of  the  unofficial 
economy  and the indicators of reforms. 
The Unofficial Economy 
As used here,  the "unofficial  economy"  constitutes  activity  that is 
not reported to  the  state  statistical  office.  For obvious  reasons,  it is 
almost never reported to the tax authorities.  While our model refers to 
firms moving  between  the official  and the unofficial  sectors,  in reality 
many firms operate in both sectors.  An officially  registered enterprise 
might produce  and sell  some  of  its output unofficially.  It would  thus 
avoid paying taxes and escape  regulations related to the production of 
this  output,  but  at the  same  time  would  not  be  able  to  rely  on  the 
government  to enforce  related contracts.  Indeed,  with respect  to this 
unofficial output, the enterprise might pay bribes rather than taxes and 
hire private protection agencies  to help with the contracts. In this way, 
the official  and unofficial  sectors are represented within a single  firm, 
and not just across firms. 
In the previously communist countries, published GDP figures rarely 
capture any of  this unofficial  activity.  The EBRD  has produced esti- 
mates of the unofficial economy for particular countries, but its numbers 
for different countries  are not comparable.2' We are not aware of  any 
other source that offers reliable cross-country estimates  for the unoffi- 
cial  economy.  Individual  government  statistical  offices  provide  some 
numbers, but these too are hard to compare across countries.22 
We use data on total electricity  consumption  to compare unofficial 
21.  EBRD (1995, annex 2.1). 
22.  For  example, for 1996 Russia's  Central  Statistical  Office, Goskomstat,  estimates 
the unofficial  economy to have been about  20 percent  of total activity. For a critique  of 
their methodology, see Russia's European  Centre  for Economic Policy, Russian Eco- 
nomic Trends, March  monthly  update, 1997, as well as Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 
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activity across countries.23 Electricity consumption offers a rough mea- 
sure  of  overall  economic  activity;  around the  world,  the  short-run 
electricity-to-GDP  elasticity  is usually  close  to  1. Measured GDP,  by 
definition,  captures only the official part of the economy,  so the differ- 
ence between  overall  and measured GDP gives  an estimate of the size 
of the unofficial  economy. 
Assuming  a unit output elasticity  may underestimate overall  GDP 
and the size of the unofficial economy.  First, there is some improvement 
in the efficiency  of electricity  use over time, particularly given the very 
low  initial  efficiency.  Second,  higher  electricity  prices  reduce  con- 
sumption per unit of output. Third, there may be a shift of the output 
mix  away  from  electricity-intensive  industries,  both  within  existing 
enterprises and in the creation of new businesses,  especially  in services. 
Fourth,  the  underreporting of  electricity  consumption  may  increase, 
although the amount of electricity  stolen is small and probably does not 
vary over time.  However,  a unit elasticity  assumption would overesti- 
mate  the  overall  size  of  a  declining  economy  if  electricity  is  used 
primarily for "overhead"  activities,  such as lighting buildings.  Energy 
efficiency  may also worsen due to neglect of essential  maintenance and 
some  substitution of electricity  for other energy sources (for example, 
switching  from gas to electric  heating).  On balance,  the unit elasticity 
assumption probably leads to only  a small underestimate of total eco- 
nomic  activity,  particularly where there has been a significant  adjust- 
ment in the relative price of electricity.24 
Drawing  on the work of Dale  Gray, Caroline Freund and Christine 
Wallich,  and discussions  with other World Bank energy experts,  Kauf- 
mann and Aleksander  Kaliberda develop  a simple  tiered classification 
of ex post output elasticity  for electricity  consumption.25 The "energy 
efficient"  economies-the  central  and eastern  European  countries, 
where  energy  price  adjustments  started earlier  and have  been  more 
23.  We use total-rather than  just industrial-electricity consumption  because  new 
private sector activities probably  use "nonindustrial"  electricity; for example, when 
service sector firms  operate  out of apartments. 
24.  Gray (1995) reports  that electricity prices for industry  in 1994 were 5.2 cents 
per kilowatt hour in Hungary  and 5.6 cents in the Czech Republic, but only 2.7 cents 
in Russia and 1.4 cents in Ukraine.  In addition,  there is strong  anecdotal  evidence that 
payment  arrears  to electricity  suppliers  are  much  higher  in the former  Soviet Union than 
in eastern  Europe. 
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significant-are  assumed to have an output elasticity of electricity  con- 
sumption  of  0.9  when  their  economies  begin  to  grow  again.  The 
"energy  neutral"  economies-the  Baltic  countries,  where  price  ad- 
justment has taken place but started later-are  assumed to have a uni- 
tary elasticity  of  electricity  consumption.  The  "energy  inefficient" 
economies-the  rest of  the former Soviet  Union,  where price adjust- 
ments started relatively  late and have been much smaller-are  assumed 
to have an output elasticity  of electricity  consumption of  1.15.26  Rela- 
tive to the unit elasticity  assumption,  these assumptions tend to reduce 
our estimate of the unofficial economy  for the former Soviet Union and 
to raise it for eastern Europe.  In particular, they address the concern 
that because  eastern Europe has experienced  much more rapid growth 
in services  than the FSU,  and services  are not as electricity  intensive 
as manufacturing,  the estimates  of  the unofficial  economy  under the 
unit elasticity  assumption  would  be  biased  upward for  the FSU  and 
downward for eastern Europe. We have rerun our regressions using the 
unit elasticity  assumption but have not found any notable differences. 
The regressions and figures presented below use electricity consumption 
data for 1995.  We have also confirmed our results using  1994 data. 
The difference  between  the change  in electricity  consumption  and 
that in official  GDP yields  an estimate of the change in the size  of the 
unofficial economy.  To calculate the growth of the unofficial economy, 
one needs to have an estimate of its initial (prereform) size.  We use the 
estimates  cited by Kaufmann and Kaliberda, based on various studies, 
suggesting  the following  shares of  unofficial  activity  in total activity 
for  1989: Bulgaria,  22.8  percent; Czech  Republic  and Slovakia,  6.0 
percent; Hungary, 27.0  percent; Poland,  15.7 percent; Romania,  22.3 
percent; and all the former Soviet  republics,  12.0  percent.27 The fact 
that the share of the unofficial economy  in the formerly Soviet countries 
is  relatively  low  is probably  due to  much greater state repression  of 
such activity  in the FSU.  The Czech Republic  and Slovakia  were also 
26.  The elasticity is usually  not the same when  output  is falling and  when  it is rising. 
Assuming an elasticity of  1. 15 for the relationship  between energy consumption  and 
output when output is increasing (because energy use is becoming less efficient) is 
equivalent  to assuming  an elasticity of 0.87 (the inverse  of 1.15) when output  is falling. 
Similarly, the assumption  of an elasticity of 0.9 for central  and eastern  Europe  when 
output is increasing  (due to an improvement  in energy efficiency) is equivalent  to an 
elasticity of 1.  11 when output  is falling. 
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highly repressed under communism and also have a low initial share of 
the unofficial  economy. 
In addition  to  estimating  the  size  of  the  unofficial  economy,  we 
calculate  the level  of  total GDP-official  plus  unofficial  GDP.28 We 
use this to examine  the effect  of  policies  on the total level  of  output 
and to check  the robustness  of  the results  obtained  by using  official 
GDP as the dependent variable. 
There are twenty-five  "transition economies"  (as listed in appendix 
D),  but we are able to use electricity  data for only seventeen.  Bulgaria, 
the Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  and the Slovak  Re- 
public in central and eastern Europe; Estonia,  Latvia,  and Lithuania in 
the Baltics; Russia,  Ukraine, Moldova,  and Belarus in the western part 
of the former Soviet  Union;  Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; 
and Uzbekistan  and  Kazakhstan  in  Central Asia.  We  have  data for 
Armenia and Kyrgystan,  but have been informed by World Bank econ- 
omists that there is no stable relationship between electricity  consump- 
tion  and  output  in  these  countries,  due  to  enormous  disruptions  in 
electricity  generation in Armenia and to large shifts toward electricity 
consumption  in Kyrgystan.  We  could  not obtain enough  information 
for the other transition countries. 
Measures  of Reform 
In examining  the  effects  of  political  control  on  economic  perfor- 
mance,  we  divide  measures of policy  into two categories.  In the first 
category  are proxies for t in our model,  including measures of general 
liberalization,  external  liberalization  (as  a proxy  for deregulation  of 
foreign  trade),  privatization,  deregulation,  and the  fairness  of  taxa- 
tion.29 We  also  use  corruption as a measure of  t,  since,  as indicated 
above,  they should be highly  correlated. 
The second category includes direct measures of public goods in the 
official  sector,  Q.  In particular, we focus  on the legal  environment  in 
different  countries,  since  this is an area in which  firms in the official 
28.  These numbers  for total GDP do not rely on our estimates of the "initial" 
unofficial  economy, but  are  derived  by assuming  that  changes  in electricity  consumption 
equal changes in total GDP, applying  the elasticity correction  described  in the text. 
29.  In some models, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1994), privatization  is directly 
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sector  derive  the  benefits  of  government  services  to  a much  greater 
extent than do firms in the unofficial  sector. 
International organizations  have  attempted to measure t and Q for 
postcommunist  economies.  We use  a variety of  sources  that evaluate 
reform from different perspectives.  Here we briefly introduce the var- 
iables; more detail is provided in appendix A. 
Based on discussions  with World Bank country economists,  Martha 
de Melo,  Cevdet Denizer,  and Alan Gelb develop  measures of internal 
liberalization,  external liberalization,  and private sector development.30 
They  provide  both a score  for each  year and an overall  "cumulative 
liberalization index,"  which is the sum of all liberalization scores since 
1989.  Since the World Bank index of internal liberalization  is the best 
available  measure  of  the  extent  to  which  prices  are still  subject  to 
government  control,  we  use  it  below.  We  rely  on  other  sources  to 
measure the extent of external liberalization  and privatization.3' 
The European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  offers ten 
measures  of  liberalization,  grouped  into  five  categories:  (1)  private 
sector share of GDP; (2)  large-scale  privatization,  small-scale  privati- 
zation,  and enterprise restructuring; (3) price liberalization,  trade and 
foreign exchange  system,  and competition  policy;  (4) banking reform 
and interest  rate  liberalization,  and securities  markets  and nonbank 
financial institutions;  and (5)  extensiveness  and effectiveness  of  legal 
rules on investment.32 Each country is given  one  of five scores,  from 
1 to 4*,  where a higher score indicates more reform and 4* effectively 
equals 5. 
Of these  measures,  we  use large-scale  privatization,  trade and for- 
eign exchange  system  (external  liberalization),  extensiveness  of  legal 
rules, and effectiveness  of legal rules in the regressions reported below. 
When we estimated  regressions  with  "small-scale  privatization,"  the 
results  were  similar  to  those  obtained  with  large-scale  privatization. 
The enterprise restructuring variable is rather vaguely  defined and al- 
most all countries get a score of either 2 or 3.  Similarly,  price liberal- 
30.  De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996). 
31.  De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb's indexes for external  liberalization  and privatiza- 
tion, however, give very similar  results  to those presented  below. 
32.  European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (1995,  1996). Scores on 
the extent and effectiveness of legal rules on investment  are provided  together, under 
"legal reform," in the summary  table (1995, table 6.1,  p.  103), but separately  in a 
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ization is defined in such a way that all countries (except Turkmenistan) 
score  3  in  1995.  For  this  reason,  we  prefer  the  World  Bank  index 
described above. The competition policy and financial institutions mea- 
sures are not directly relevant to this paper. 
We rely on the International Monetary Fund for data on the budget 
deficit  as a percentage  of  GDP and log  inflation.33 We have obtained 
updated data that we  understand to  represent the  latest  official  IMF 
estimates through the end of  1996.34 We use official GDP data from the 
World Bank. 
In addition to data provided by these international organizations,  we 
use several independent assessments  of the extent and nature of reform. 
For  three  years,  1995-97,  the  Central  European  Economic  Review 
(CEER), published as a supplement to the Wall Street Journal Europe, 
has  asked  a panel  of  western  experts,  primarily from the investment 
community,  to rate reform in transition economies  on various dimen- 
sions.35 Each year's  panel  is  different,  as are the questions  that it is 
asked. We look at the four measures that are relevant to our discussion: 
legal safeguards,  crime and corruption, and the tax fairness index (from 
the 1996 issue);  and rule of law (from 1997).  For more detail on these 
ratings,  see  appendix B. 
The tax fairness  index is particularly important for the analysis  that 
follows.  It is designed  to reflect both rates of taxation and fairness of 
administration.  Conceptually,  this is the proper approach. In terms of 
posted rates of taxation, Russia and other countries of the former Soviet 
Union are not much different from most of eastern Europe.36 However, 
33.  Results using earlier versions of these data have been published in Fischer, 
Sahay, and  Vegh (1996b). We have looked  at additional  measures  of inflation  and  budget 
performance,  available from the EBRD and the World Bank's Office of  the Chief 
Economist. The IMF appears  to have the best series, both in terms of comparability 
across countries  and in terms of being revised to reflect  retrospective  reevaluations  by 
country  statistical  offices and by the IMF. We do note, however, that there are at least 
two different  estimates  of budget  deficits  for the former  Soviet countries  within  the IMF 
itself; see Cheasty  and Davis (1996) and Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996a, 1996b). 
Note, also, that inflation is used in logs to avoid distortion  of the results due to 
Georgia's very high inflation  in 1994 and 1995. 
34.  Ratna  Sahay, International  Monetary  Fund,  personal  communication,  November 
1996. 
35.  "Through  a  Glass  Darkly,"  Central  European  Economic  Review,  February 
1995, pp. 8-9;  "The Great  Growth  Race," CEER,  December 1995-January  1996, pp. 
8-9,  13; "Continental  Divide," CEER,  December 1996-January  1997, pp. 10-1 1, 27. 
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it appears that tax administration is a good deal more capricious  in the 
FSU,  with  different  parts of  government  collecting  taxes  arbitrarily. 
The CEER panel deems that this leads to lower  scores on tax fairness 
(or a higher "tax burden")  in the FSU.37 
The Heritage Foundation scores  almost every  country in the world 
on ten measures of "economic  freedom":  trade policy,  taxation policy, 
government consumption of economic  output, monetary policy,  capital 
flows and foreign investment,  banking policy,  wage and price controls, 
property rights,  regulation,  and  the  black  market.38 The  ratings  on 
regulation,  the variable of  most interest to us,  are somewhat  idiosyn- 
cratic. For example,  in 1996 Poland, Russia,  and Belarus all get a score 
of 2,  which  seems  quite unreasonable-especially  because  the criteria 
for this  score  include  "no  bribes,"  which  anecdotal  and survey  evi- 
dence clearly  contradict for each of these countries.39 As implausible, 
the Czech  Republic  gets  a perfect 4.  We use this index with caution. 
We  use  the  1996  ratings  (primarily reporting on  1995),  which  cover 
twenty transition countries,  including fifteen of the seventeen for which 
we  have  reliable  electricity  data (that is,  excepting  Kazakhstan  and 
Uzbekistan).  Comparing these 1996 ratings with economic performance 
data from  1995 is not likely  to create a large bias. 
Freedom House  measures political  freedom  around the world in its 
"Comparative Survey of Freedom,"  which "does not rate governments 
per  se  but  rather the  rights  and  freedoms  individuals  have  in  each 
country  and  territory.' '40  Countries  are  assessed  both  on  "political 
rights [which] enable people to participate freely in the political process 
no significant  results in our regressions  if we use the EBRD's measure  of corporate  tax 
rates  (EBRD, 1996, annex 2.2). The posted rates are too similar  across countries. 
37.  "We asked our panel to rank  each of the twenty-six countries  on the basis of 
their attractiveness  as a place to do business over the coming year. Grades  were given 
on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 the lowest and 10 the highest score." ("The Great  Growth 
Race,"  Central European Economic  Review,  December  1995-January  1996,  p. 9) One 
of the categories is  "tax burden." Although tax rates are relatively similar across 
countries,  the scores for this variable  vary widely. Our  interpretation  is that  the experts 
were taking  into account  both tax rates  and the fairness  of tax administration. 
38.  Johnson  and Sheehy (1996, chap. 3). To facilitate  comparison  with measures  of 
reform  from  other  sources, we rescale  their  variables  by multiplying  by (-  1) and  adding 
5, so that  each index runs  from 0 to 4, where a higher  score is better. 
39.  See Frye and Shleifer (1997) and Kaufmann  (1997). 
40.  Freedom  House, "The Comparative  Survey of Freedom 1995-96,"  available 
on the Freedom  House worldwide  web page. Data used in this paper  were downloaded 
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.  .  .the  system  by  which  the polity  chooses  the authoritative policy 
makers and attempts to make binding decisions  affecting  the national, 
regional,  or local community,"  and on "civil  liberties  [which] are the 
freedoms  to develop  views,  institutions  and personal  autonomy  apart 
from the state."  Each is rated on a seven-point  scale,  with  1 being the 
most free and 7 the least free.4' We rescale their variable by multiplying 
by (-  1) and adding 7,  so that a higher score is better. Freedom House 
ratings are always reported for two years-for  example,  1995-96-but 
our interpretation is that they pertain primarily to the first year of  the 
pair, so we assign the 1995-96  score to  1995. 
In 1997, Freedom House published new measures of political reform 
for postcommunist  countries.42 These include assessments  of "political 
process"  and "civil  society,"  which  appear to be very close  to their 
previous  measures  of  political  rights  and civil  liberties.  In addition, 
however,  they  assess  "independent  media,"  "rule  of  law,"  and 
"government  and public administration. " Again, we rescale all indexes 
from 0 to 6,  with 6 representing the highest level  of achievement. 
On the whole,  experts  agree  in their rankings of  the extent  of  re- 
form.43 Appendix  C illustrates the similarity of rankings, giving  a de- 
tailed comparison for alternative ratings of the legal environment in the 
former Soviet Union.  None of our main results is sensitive to the choice 
of index. 
Control  Variables 
Undoubtedly,  there are important structural differences between cen- 
tral and eastern Europe and the former Soviet  Union that must be taken 
into account.  Some of these differences  are unrelated to the model.  For 
example,  the Soviet  Union  had a larger military-industrial production 
sector and its constituent  countries  suffered greater disruption to their 
41.  These scores are assigned after  evaluating  a checklist of subcategories  for each 
of political rights  and  civil liberties;  for details, see Freedom  House, "The Comparative 
Survey of Freedom 1995-96,"  pp. 2-3  (available on the Freedom  House worldwide 
web page). Their  civil liberties  measure  is highly correlated  with their  political  freedom 
index, and we do not find any differences  between our econometric  results  for the two 
variables.  The results  reported  below use only "political freedom." 
42.  See Shor (1997). 
43.  For  example, Aslund, Boone, and  Johnson  (1996) compare  four  sets of rankings 
of former Soviet countries by the World Bank, the International  Monetary  Fund, the 
EBRD, and Ernst  & Young and find much agreement. Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  181 
trade following  the fall of communism.  Other differences  may reflect 
heterogeneity  in the model's  parameters. For example,  countries in the 
former Soviet Union may have an inferior technology  for the production 
of public goods.  Their much longer communist history meant that they 
did not have the commercial  laws  and other capitalist  institutions  de- 
veloped  during the  1920s  and  1930s  that Poland,  Hungary,  and the 
Czech  Republic  could  go  back to  after the fall  of  communism.  Such 
heterogeneity  would  lead  to  a dispersion  of  outcomes  similar  to that 
predicted by our model with multiple equilibria. 
An obvious  way to control for these  differences  is to use a dummy 
variable for belonging  to the former Soviet  Union; we run each of our 
regressions  both with and without this control.  Both the heterogeneity 
model and the formal model detailed above predict that the FSU dummy 
is correlated with the share of the unofficial  economy,  and also that it 
reduces the partial correlation between  that share and our measures of 
t and Q. 
Empirically,  we  cannot distinguish  these two  models.  However,  it 
is important to emphasize that it does not much matter whether the data 
are generated by unmeasured heterogeneity between eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet  Union  or by a model  with multiple  equilibria.  Our 
model  suggests  that relatively  small  differences  in  initial  conditions 
may be magnified by the mechanisms that we describe,  leading to large 
differences  in the size  of  the unofficial  economy  and in performance 
more generally.  In our empirical  work,  we  attempt to understand the 
relationship  between  taxation  and regulation,  the provision  of  public 
goods,  the size of the unofficial economy,  and growth. The basic mes- 
sage of our story about the role of the unofficial  economy  in transition 
holds regardless of whether the FSU has ended up where it is because 
of bad history,  bad policies,  or bad luck. 
In addition to the FSU dummy,  we include the original share of the 
unofficial  economy  as a control variable.  The initial year of reform is 
taken to be the "year of most intense reform,"  as identified by Anders 
Aslund,  Peter  Boone,  and Johnson,  and  is  set  equal  to  zero.44 We 
44.  See Aslund, Boone, and Johnson  (1996, table 3). Determining  the first  year of 
reform  is uncontroversial  for most countries. All members  of the former  Soviet Union 
(with the arguable  exceptions of Lithuania  and Estonia in the Baltics) clearly started 
reform  in 1992, while Poland, Hungary,  and Romania  began in 1990, and Albania in 
1992. The Czech Republic,  Slovakia, and  Bulgaria  could be interpreted  as having  begun 182  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
determine the beginning  of  reform by substantial price liberalization, 
which,  in effect,  means that every  country is assumed to have started 
reform by  1994.45 
Effects on the Unofficial Economy 
In this  section,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  the  tax  and 
regulatory burden and the supply of public goods,  on the one hand, and 
the size of the unofficial  economy,  on the other. 
The Share of the Unofficial Economy 
Table  1 shows  the results  of  estimating  the share of  the unofficial 
economy  (U)  in total  GDP,  using  the electricity  consumption-based 
methodology  explained above. The table reveals some interesting facts. 
The average unofficial  share in east European countries  starts in  1989 
at 16.6 percent, peaks at 21.3  percent in 1992,  and falls to 19.0 percent 
by  1995.  By  contrast,  the  average  unofficial  share in former  Soviet 
countries starts at 12.0 percent and rises to 36.2  percent in 1994 before 
dropping to 34.4  percent in  1995.  The upper panel of  figure 2 shows 
the pattern of  the average share of the unofficial  economy  in Europe, 
in the Baltics,  and in the rest of the FSU over the period 1989-95;  the 
lower panel of the figure compares the share of the unofficial economy 
in Poland and Russia over the same period.  Between  1989 and 1995, 
the  unofficial  economy's  share in  both  Poland  and Romania  fell  by 
around 3 percentage  points.  In Russia  and Ukraine,  by contrast,  the 
share of unofficial  economy  rose by 29.6  and 36.9  percentage points, 
respectively,  over  the same period.  In both Belarus  and Uzbekistan, 
the share of  the unofficial  economy  is low;  it has hardly increased  in 
in 1990 or 1991. At least for the analysis in this paper, these differences as to when 
reform  "started" do not seem to affect the results. 
45.  The main alternative  way of dating  reform  is according  to when the IMF  deems 
countries to  "have stabilized." This method is used by Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 
(1996b) and by Hellman (1996). Using this measure  in our cross-country  regressions 
does not appear  to make a difference and these results are not reported.  However, it 
does have implications  for the interpretation  of individual  country  reform  effects: most 
notably, by this method,  Russia "reformed"  in April 1995, in contrast  with our date of 
January  1992, under  the Aslund, Boone and Johnson  (1996) method. 0  _0  0  ON  r  5  -  5  -  00  0  n  0  )  0)  C-  '\  5 
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Figure  2. The Share of the Unofficial  Economy  in Transition  Countries,  1989-95 
Unofficial/total  GDP  (percent) 
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Belarus and has actually declined in Uzbekistan.  This is consistent  with 
our notion that in these countries the state has suppressed the unofficial 
sector.46 
Adjusting for the unofficial  economy  implies  a substantial revision 
in GDP numbers for some  countries,  as is also  shown  in table  1. For 
example,  we estimate  that Russian GDP in  1995 was actually  around 
75 percent of  its  1989  level,  rather than the 49.1  percent indicated  in 
official  statistics.  The countries  with the greatest drop in official  GDP 
from  1989  to  1995  receive  the largest upward correction  in our total 
GDP estimates.  For example,  Georgian GDP in 1995 is estimated to be 
37.6 percent of its 1989 level,  not the 16.0 percent suggested by official 
statistics,  while  for Poland our estimate  of  total GDP  (1994  or  1995 
relative  to  1989)  is actually  slightly  smaller than the official  number. 
The direction of the correction should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the empirical results below. 
The Impact of Taxation, Regulation,  and Corruption 
Figures  3  and 4  offer  a first look  at the data.  Figure  3  shows  the 
share of the unofficial economy  in total GDP and the Central European 
Economic Review's  tax fairness index.  In general,  a lower tax fairness 
score is associated  with a higher share of the unofficial  economy,  just 
as the model predicts.  In Belarus and Uzbekistan,  however,  the gov- 
ernment has been able to sustain low  tax fairness without a large part 
46.  These estimates of the unofficial economy are generally consistent with other 
estimates for particular  countries, based on microsurveys  and other independent  esti- 
mations.  For example, Kaufmann  (1997), using firm-level  surveys, finds  that  about  half 
of value added  is not reported  in Ukraine.  For  Poland,  Zienkowsky  (1996) estimates  the 
unofficial  economy at less than  20 percent  by 1993. 
We would emphasize, however, that  our estimation  procedure  is subject  to a margin 
of error.  The pretransition  estimates  of the unofficial  economy for eastern  Europe  could 
be on the high side. Further,  the energy efficiency gains from energy price adjustments 
in those countries  may, in reality, have exceeded our assumed "efficiency elasticity" 
assumptions.  But these effects would counteract  each other, resulting  in similar post- 
transition  estimates  of the unofficial  economy. One  could only obtain  significantly  larger 
estimates  than ours for the unofficial  economies of eastern  Europe  by the mid-1990s if 
the initial baseline estimates  were too low or the energy efficiency gains were substan- 
tially larger. For the FSU economies, it is plausible  both that the initial estimate  of 12 
percent  is somewhat  low, and that  there  have been more  gains in energy  efficiency than 
we assume. Thus it may be that by the mid-1990s, the unofficial  economy in the FSU 
was even larger  than  we estimate. 186  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1997 
Figure  3. Tax Fairness  and Unofficial  Output, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
Unofficial/total  GDP  (percent) 
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Source:  Tax fairness ratings  are from the Cenitral  Europeani  Econiomic  Review  (CEER);  see appendix  A. For data on the unoffi- 
cial economy's share,  see table 1. 
of  the economy  moving  into the unofficial  sector.  Similarly,  figure 4 
shows  that the quality  of  public  goods  (measured in this case  by the 
CEER index  of  legal  safeguards  for investment)  is  higher where  the 
share of the unofficial  sector is lower.  Again,  Belarus and Uzbekistan 
are outliers: the quality of public goods  is poor,  but relatively  little of 
their economies  has switched  into the unofficial  sector. 
Figures  3 and 4  suggest  that our basic  model  does  not adequately 
describe  Belarus  and Uzbekistan.  The  most  likely  reason  is  that the 
assumption  of  free mobility  of economic  activity  between  the official 
and the unofficial  sectors is violated:  the state has remained so repres- 
sive  that entrepreneurs cannot switch into the unofficial  sector.  Figure 
5 confirms this interpretation with data on the Freedom House indexes 
of  rule of  law  and political  process.  Belarus  and Uzbekistan-along 
with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,  which are not in our sample due to 
lack of electricity  data-are  by far the most politically  repressed coun- 
tries. To encompass  them,  we need to expand the model to allow for a Simon Johnson,  Daniel  Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  187 
Figure  4.  Legal Safeguards  and Unofficial  Output, Selected  Transition  Economies, 
1995 
Unofficial/total  GDP  (percent) 
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Source:  Legal safeguards  ratings  are from the CEER;  see appendix  A. For data  on the unofficial  economy's share,  see table 1. 
state that represses the unofficial  sector rather than competing  with it. 
Below,  we continue  to include Belarus and Uzbekistan  in the graphs, 
but omit them as observations  in our regressions. 
Table 2 reports the results from regressions of the share of unofficial 
economy  in total GDP on measures of  state control over the economy 
(that  is,  our  t  variables)  for  a  cross-section  of  fifteen  countries.  A 
negative  coefficient  implies  that a lower  t is  associated  with  a larger 
share of  the unofficial  economy  in total GDP.  For each  variable,  we 
report in the first column  the results for ordinary least squares regres- 
sions,  with only the state control variable and a constant. In the second 
column,  we include a dummy for belonging to the former Soviet Union; 
and in the third column,  we  control  for countries'  initial  (prereform) 
shares of unofficial  activity. 
The first independent variable measuring state control is the World 
Bank measure of  internal liberalization,  which  lies  between  0 and  1. 
This variable is significantly  correlated with the unofficial  share of the 188  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 5.  Political  Process and Rule of Law, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
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economy,  regardless of whether one uses the dummy for belonging  to 
the FSU.  An increase of 0. 1 in this index in 1995 reduces the share of 
the unofficial  economy  by around 13 to  16 percentage points. 
The second  independent  variable,  the EBRD's  measure of external 
liberalization,  runs from  1 to  5,  although  the  countries  actually  lie 
between  2 and 5.  This  variable is significant  both by itself  and when 
we include the FSU dummy and initial share. A 1 point increase in this 
index reduces the share of the unofficial economy  by 14 to 18 percent- 
age points. 
The third independent variable is the EBRD's  measure of large-scale 
privatization,  on a scale  of  1 to 5.  This policy  variable is  negatively 
correlated  with  the unofficial  share of  total GDP,  and the coefficient 
suggests  that a 1 point increase in the score of large-scale  privatization 
is associated  with a 10 to 13 percentage point reduction in the share of 
the unofficial  economy.  When we use the former Soviet Union dummy 
instead  of  the  initial  unofficial  share,  this  result  is  weaker  but still O~~~~~~~~~~  c  e 
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significant.  The FSU dummy itself  is significant only at the 10 percent 
level. 
The fourth independent variable, the CEER tax fairness index, is also 
significant  and has  the  predicted  sign  in the regression.  As  figure  3 
shows  (Belarus and Uzbekistan  aside),  fairer taxes mean that a smaller 
share of the economy  is unofficial.47 This evidence  supports the prop- 
osition  that higher tax burdens drive firms into the unofficial economy. 
The  fifth  and  sixth  independent  variables  represent  two  types  of 
"taxation"  that do not yield government revenues: corruption and reg- 
ulation.  Our proxy  for  corruption  is  the  CEER index  of  crime  and 
corruption, which ranges from 1 to 10. This measure is significant with 
the expected  sign when used in the share regression.  A 1 point improve- 
ment in the index-that  is,  a decrease in corruption-reduces  the share 
of the unofficial  economy  by 5 to 6 percentage points. 
Our proxy  for  regulation  is  the  Heritage  Foundation's  regulation 
index.  A  1 point increase  in this index lowers  the unofficial  economy 
share by  11 to  14 percentage  points.  Figure  6 confirms  the negative 
relationship between regulation and the share of the unofficial economy. 
The Impact of the Legal Environment 
We use four measures of the legal environment. These can be thought 
of as proxying  for Q in our model; that is,  the supply of public goods 
to  the  official  sector.  The  first two  measures  are evaluations  by  two 
different CEER panels of "legal  safeguards for investment"  and of the 
"rule of law. " The third and fourth measures, from the EBRD, evaluate 
the countries  in  terms of  the  de jure extensiveness  and the de  facto 
effectiveness  of legal  systems  in protecting investment. 
While figure 4 presents the relationship between the CEER measure 
of  legal  safeguards  and the share of  the unofficial  economy,  figure 7 
47.  The CEER  and  Heritage  Foundation  estimates  of tax fairness  differ  significantly. 
The Heritage  Foundation's  taxation  index  (where  a higher  score  means  a greater  effective 
tax rate) is not significantly  correlated  with the unofficial  share  of the economy. In the 
Heritage  Foundation  measure,  tax fairness  is relatively  low (a score  of 1 out of a potential 
4)  in economies with a relatively low unofficial economy share (such as the Czech 
Republic and Hungary)  and in those with a relatively high share (such as Russia and 
Azerbaijan).  Since the Heritage  Foundation  does not provide data on Uzbekistan,  we 
have only fourteen  data  points when we use its measures  of reform. Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  191 
Figure  6. Regulation  and Unofficial  Output, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
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shows  the relationship between  the EBRD measure of legal  effective- 
ness and that share. Together, these figures yield two conclusions.  First, 
across most countries,  there is a negative relationship between the sup- 
ply of law and order to the official economy  and the relative size of the 
unofficial  economy.  Second,  Belarus and Uzbekistan  are again excep- 
tions,  with  low  provision  of  public  goods  and yet  low  shares of  the 
unofficial  economy.  As  above,  we  omit these  two countries from the 
regressions. 
Once again,  there are sharp differences  between eastern Europe and 
the Baltics  on one hand, and the rest of the FSU,  on the other. Eastern 
Europe and the Baltics  have significantly  higher scores  on legal  envi- 
ronment. In the CEER measure of the rule of law,  only Bulgaria of the 
east European countries has a lower score than the highest-scoring  FSU 
country  outside  of  the  Baltics,  Moldova,  and the  difference  is  very 
small.  The difference  in the CEER measure of legal safeguards is even 192  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure  7.  Legal Effectiveness  and Unofficial  Output,  Selected  Transition  Economies, 
1995 
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more striking (see  figure 4): the lowest  score among the east European 
and Baltic  countries  is 5.6  (Romania) and the highest  score within the 
FSU,  excluding  the Baltics,  is 4.3  (Moldova). 
Table  3  shows  the  relationship  between  the four measures  of  the 
legal  environment  and the share of the unofficial  economy  in 1995.  A 
higher score means a better environment for official  business.  In table 
3,  all the measures  have the predicted  sign  and are significant  in ex- 
plaining  the unofficial  economy  share.  This  is  strong support for the 
theoretical prediction that the unofficial economy  is larger where public 
goods are poorer in the official  sector and, in particular, where the rule 
of law is weaker.  Controlling for initial share, a 1 point increase in the 
index of legal safeguards (which ranges from 1 to 10) is associated with 
a 6.3  percentage  point  fall  in the share of  the unofficial  economy;  a 
change in the rule of law index has a slightly smaller effect.  The indexes oo  oo  f>I  d-  m  m?  ,cX~~~C 
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of  legal effectiveness and extensiveness have a similar size effect, 
although  it is hard  to compare  precisely because they range from 1 to 
5. The first  three  measures  of legal environment  retain  their  significance 
if we use the FSU dummy, but the effect is weaker-consistent  with 
the possible multiplicity  of equilibria.  All four measures  are significant 
when one controls for the initial share  of the unofficial economy. 
The Relationship  between Taxation,  Government Spending,  and the 
Quality of Public  Goods 
Our model is based on public finance mechanisms that relate tax 
revenue (T) and the provision of public goods (Q). As such, it makes 
other  predictions  in addition  to those tested in tables 2 and 3. First, tax 
revenues  should  be lower when  the tax burden  is excessive, as measured 
by a low tax fairness score. Second, assuming that tax revenues and 
government  spending  are strongly  positively correlated,  lower tax rev- 
enues should be associated  with a lower supply  of public goods. In this 
subsection, we briefly examine the evidence bearing  on these predic- 
tions. 
Figure  8 confirms  that  with the exception  of Belarus  and  Uzbekistan, 
tax revenue  (as a percentage  of total  GDP, which includes  the unofficial 
economy) improves with tax fairness. Equivalent 1994 data indicate 
that both tax revenue and tax fairness are high in the Czech Republic 
and Poland. From figure 8,  Russia has an intermediate  tax fairness 
score,  but not high enough for a lot of tax revenue.  Belarus and 
Uzbekistan  are anomalous  because  the high level of political repression 
enables the state to keep firms in the official sector (and therefore  to 
maintain  its revenue), even though  tax fairness and the level of public 
goods provision are both low. 
Our model assumes that tax revenue and government  spending are 
equivalent. Figure  9 shows the time series of tax revenues  as a share  of 
total GDP for Russia and Poland  during  transition.  In Poland revenue 
initially fell with reform, but then increased;  in Russia, it continued  to 
fall. More generally, appendix D presents the available numbers  for 
1994 and 1995 on general  government  spending  as a percentage  of both 
official and total GDP. General government  spending in Poland was 
48.8 percent of official GDP in 1989, 39.8 percent  in 1990, and 47.5 
percent  in 1994; in the Czech Republic  it was 60.1 percent  in 1990 and Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  195 
Figure  8. Tax Fairness  and Tax Revenue,  Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
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Source:  Tax fairness  ratings  are from the CEER;  see appendix  A. Tax revenue  data are from European  Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development  (1996). For  GDP data, see table I. 
50.0  percent in 1994; and in Hungary it was 53.5  percent in 1990 and 
56.1  percent in  1995.  By contrast,  Russian government  spending  fell 
from 60.5  percent of official  GDP in 1992 to 31.9  percent in 1995.  As 
a  share of  total  GDP,  general  government  spending  was  around 40 
percent for Poland in  1994 and below  20 percent for Russia in  1995. 
There has been  a large decline  in general  government  spending  as a 
percentage of GDP in the FSU countries other than the Baltics,  but not 
in eastern Europe or the Baltics. 
Figure 10 shows that tax revenues are highly correlated with govern- 
ment spending. This figure suggests that internal and external borrowing 
generally are not critical determinants of the government budget in these 
countries  and justifies  our assumption that tax revenue  approximately 
equals spending. 
Figure  i11 completes  the picture by showing  a positive  relationship 
between tax revenue and the quality of legal safeguards. It supports the 
importance of  the public finance mechanism  suggested  by our model; 196  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 9.  Tax Revenue  since Start of Reform,  Poland and Russia 
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from European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (I1996).  For GDP data, see table I. 
a. Year  0 is the first  year of reform:  for Poland 1990 = 0, for Russia 1992 = 0. 
namely, that countries with fair tax systems raise more revenue and 
hence supply more public goods. In turn, the better supply of public 
goods may enhance the tax base and tax revenues. 
Summary 
The results of regressions  using the share  of the unofficial  economy 
(U) on the left-hand side confirm  our theoretical  predictions  for both 
the tax rate (t) and public goods (Q) in the state sector. Liberalization, 
privatization,  fairer taxation, and fewer regulations  are all associated 
with a smaller  unofficial economy. Better  provision  of public goods to 
the official economy is associated  with a relatively larger  official econ- 
omy.  Finally, public finance mechanisms do appear to be at work: 
countries  with less distortionary  tax and  regulatory  systems  collect more 
tax revenue and provide more public goods to their  official economies. 
An ex ante plausible criticism of the model is that our electricity- Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  197 
Figure 10. Tax Revenue  and Government  Spending,  Selected  Transition  Economies, 
1995 
Tax  revenue/total  GDP  (percent) 
Slovak Rep.- 
40  - 
0  Uzbekistan 
Belarus  a 
Estonia  Hungary 
30  - 
Latvia 
0 
Ukraine  *  Bulgaria 
20  -  0 
Russia  Lithuania 
0 
Kazakhstan  0 Moldova 
10_ 
Azerbaijan 
0  Georgia 
0 
0  10  20  30  40  50 
Government  spending/total  GDP  (percent) 
Source:  Data for tax revenue and government  spending are from European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development (1996). 
For  GDP data, see table 1. 
based calculations  of the unofficial economy are founded  on too many 
implausible  assumptions  and are therefore  too noisy to be useful. But 
if our estimates of the size of the unofficial economy are pure noise, 
why do they line up so well with the measures  of t and  Q? The objection 
loses much  of its power in light of the extremely  strong  raw  correlations 
between our constructed measures of the unofficial economy and a 
variety of other variables. At this cross-sectional level, then, the pre- 
dictions of the theoretical  model are strongly  confirmed. 
Effects on Growth 
In this section, we examine  whether  taxation  and  the supply  of public 
goods are correlated  with output growth across countries. Our model 
predicts that the effects of t and Q should be stronger on officially 198  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 11. Legal Safeguards  and Tax Revenue,  Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
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Source: Legal safeguards  ratings are from the CEER;  see appendix  A. Tax revenue  data are from European  Bank for Recon- 
struction  and Development  ( 1996). For  GDP data, see table 1. 
measured GDP, because t and Q directly affect firms in the official 
sector. But there should also be an effect on total GDP (which includes 
the unofficial economy) if the unofficial  sector is less efficient than  the 
official sector. 
For each country, we examine two measures  of GDP (both indexes 
constructed to equal 100 in 1989): official output in 1995 and total 
output in 1995. The level of GDP in 1995 should capture  cumulative 
performance  better  than  the growth  rate in any one year. 
As above, we control for initial conditions. There is a strong rela- 
tionship between the initial output  decline (a negative number)  in the 
"first" year of reform (as defined above) and total level of output in 
1995: that is, when the initial output  fall is larger, total output  in 1995 
is lower. The baseline regressions that we report in the tables below 
use the initial output  fall as a control  variable.  We also check the results 
with a dummy  for having belonged to the Soviet Union. Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  199 
Figure 12. Tax Fairness  and Official  Output, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
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Source:  Tax fairness  ratings  are from the CEER;  see appendix  A. For GDP data, see table 1. 
Official Output 
Figure  12 shows  that,  with  the familiar  exception  of  Belarus  and 
Uzbekistan,  higher tax fairness is associated with higher official output. 
Table 4 confirms a significant positive  correlation between official out- 
put in  1995  and the EBRD's  measures  of  external  liberalization  and 
privatization,  as  well  as  the  CEER's  tax  fairness  index.  A  1 point 
increase in external liberalization  or privatization translates into about 
a 10 index point increase in the size of the official economy  (controlling 
for belonging  to the FSU).  The tax fairness  index  also has a positive 
and significant  coefficient,  meaning  that less  distortionary  taxes  are 
associated  with a smaller output decline. 
These  measures of the taxation parameter (t) have a significant  im- 
pact on 1995 output, even when we control for the initial fall in output. 
The  index  of  crime  and corruption  is  also  significant.  The  Heritage 
Foundation  measure  of  regulation  has  the  predicted  positive  sign, I  ''-  &,  V)  o.  o  X  V)~~~~~) 
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although in two  specifications  it is  significant  at only  the  10 percent 
level.  Finally,  a higher share of the unofficial economy (as derived from 
our electricity  calculations)  is associated with a lower level of officially 
measured GDP. Without any controls,  the R2 in this regression is 0.69. 
This  result  may  be  spurious,  however,  since  the denominator  in the 
share of the unofficial  economy  is the total size of the economy. 
Table 5 shows  that there are positive  associations  between  official 
output performance and our four measures of legal reform. These results 
are robust to controlling  for the initial fall in output. Without including 
any other variables,  the R2 in these regressions  is as high as 0.72  (for 
legal  safeguards),  and it lies  between  0.64  and 0.77  with the control 
for the initial fall in output. 
The results  in tables  4  and 5 become  weaker when one  includes  a 
dummy  for the  FSU,  or the  FSU  without  the Baltics.  The  countries 
form two clusters: eastern Europe and the Baltics  have relatively  high 
public  goods  provision-in  terms of  a good  legal  environment-and 
better official output performance, on average, than the countries of the 
FSU other than the Baltics. 
Total Output 
Our measures of t and Q are less strongly correlated with total output 
than with official  output. Table 6 shows  that the standard measures of 
the broadly defined tax burden are not robustly significant. The external 
liberalization,  tax fairness,  and crime and corruption variables yield the 
strongest results,  but none are significant when one includes  a dummy 
for belonging  to the former Soviet  Union.  Table 7 shows  that all four 
measures of legal  environment have a strong positive  correlation with 
total output, but even this breaks down when one controls for belonging 
to the FSU.  Figure 13 plots total GDP against tax fairness.  Comparison 
with figure 12, which also has tax fairness on the x-axis,  illustrates the 
point that total activity  is not as strongly correlated with institutional 
reform as is official  activity. 
These results provide some support for the argument that total output, 
and not just  the official  output,  is reduced  by  excessive  government 
intervention.  At the same time,  the results also suggest  that the mafia 
provides firms that operate unofficially  with public goods which,  if not 
of so high a quality as those delivered by the state in the official  sector, *  -  s  q -  X  es rJ)~~~~~o 
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Figure 13. Tax Fairness  and Total  Output, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1995 
Total  GDP  (index,  1989  = 100) 
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Source:  Tax fairness  ratings  are from the CEER;  see appendix  A. For GDP data, see table 1. 
are certainly good enough for the unofficial economy  to function.  Thus 
in transition economies,  the mafia should not be viewed  entirely  as a 
social  pathology.  Rather, it is a market accommodation  to the failure 
of  the  state to  deliver  an attractive combination  of  taxes  and public 
goods.  The mafia imposes taxes like the state and provides public goods 
like the state,  though it evidently  does not do so quite as efficiently  as 
a well-functioning  state. 
Stabilization Revisited 
Several  recent  studies  have  pointed  to the benefits  of  stabilization 
for economic  growth in transition economies.48 Table 8 confirms their 
findings with our sample. Countries with lower inflation and better fiscal 
balance have higher official output and a smaller unofficial sector share 
48.  See, for example, Aslund, Boone, and  Johnson  (1996); World  Bank  (1996b). Nn  N 
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of the economy, although  there  is no robust  result  for total (official plus 
unofficial) output. The effect on official output  is less strong than for 
our t and Q variables, in the sense that  the coefficient on fiscal balance 
is insignificant  and, when the FSU control is added, the coefficient on 
log inflation  is significant  at only the 10 percent  level. 
0 
Aslund, Boone, and  Johnson  show also that  all transition  economies 
have eventually stabilized, although some have had more significant 
liberalization  than others.49  Countries  that deregulated  their econom- 
ies-that  is, most of eastern Europe-stabilized  early, whereas coun- 
tries  that  did not deregulate-that is, most of the former  Soviet Union- 
stabilized  later. But by the third  year  of reform,  even most of the former 
Soviet countries had inflation  under  control. The experience with sta- 
bilization and liberalization  may introduce  a spurious  correlation  be- 
tween stabilization  and  growth.  The good growth  of the early stabilizers 
in eastern Europe might be attributed  primarily  to the reduction of 
inflation, even if deregulation  and depoliticization  have been equally 
important.  Conversely, the poor growth of the late stabilizers in the 
former  Soviet Union might be attributed  to their failure  to reduce  infla- 
tion quickly enough, even though the real reason is their continued 
politicization. 
Figure 14, which compares inflation in Poland and Russia during 
transition, shows that Poland had smaller initial inflation  and a more 
rapid  disinflation.50  But by the fourth  year of reform-1994  for Poland 
and 1996 for Russia-the  difference was not large. By early 1997, 
when reform  in the former  Soviet countries  was entering  its fifth year, 
Russia's annual inflation  was below 20 percent. By the end of 1997, 
inflation may be even lower in Russia than in Poland. Nonetheless, 
growth  has been much faster in Poland  than in Russia. 
As of this writing, it is extremely difficult to separate  empirically 
the benefits of  stabilization from the benefits of liberalization and 
deregulation. Time may tell.  Meanwhile, some highly preliminary 
evidence suggests that the effects of depoliticization and institution- 
building  should  not be underestimated.  For  example, panel  data  regres- 
sions (with fixed effects) indicate  that in terms of the effect on output, 
stabilization  may be less important  than deregulation.  Table 9 shows 
49.  Aslund, Boone, and Johnson  (1996) 
50.  A graph  that  compared  Polish and Ukrainian  inflation  would look very similar. 208  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 14. Inflation  since Start of Reform,  Poland  and Russia 
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Source: First reform  year is the year of most intense reform  from Aslund, Boone, and Johnson  (1996). For inflation  data, see 
appendix  A. 
a. Year  0 is the first  year of reform:  for Poland 1990 = 0, for Russia 1992 = 0. 
the results of regressing total output (official plus unofficial GDP) on 
log inflation, internal  liberalization, and privatization,  controlling for 
the year relative to the start  of reform. In some regressions  we use the 
share  of the unofficial  economy as a proxy for both the extent of regu- 
lation  and  the quality  of public  goods because  we do not have a complete 
time series for any of the t or Q variables  discussed above. 
When  we run  the standard  regression  for 1989-94 (without  the share 
of the unofficial  economy), log inflation  is significant  at the 10 percent 
level and privatization  is insignificant.  Internal  liberalization  is signif- 
icant, but has the wrong sign. When we include the share  of the unof- 
ficial economy on the right-hand  side,  it has a significant negative 
coefficient and  the other  coefficients  are  not significant.  However, when 
we use the period 1992-95,  none of the variables is significant (with 
the exception of  internal liberalization, which has the wrong sign). 
Overall, the evidence suggests some skepticism about  the proposition Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  209 
Table  9.  Panel Regressions  Explaining  Total  Output in Selected Transition 
Economiesa 
Independent  variable  1989-94  1992-95 
Years since start of reformb  -  4.1t  -  3.6t  -  1.5  -  1.5 
(1.0)  (1.0)  (1.4)  (1.4) 
Log inflationc  -  1.1*  0.1  -0.0  0.2 
(0.6)  (0.7)  (1. 1)  (1.2) 
Internal  liberalization  -8.6t  -8.0  -34.61  -32.8t 
(5.2)  (4.8)  (10.4)  (11.5) 
Privatization  0.5  0.3  -1.7  -1.6 
(1.5)  (1.4)  (2.4)  (2.4) 
Unofficial output shared  -  t0.5  -0.  1 
(0. 1)  (0.2) 
Summary  statistic 
N  90  90  60  60 
R  2  0.76  0.79  0.54  0.54 
Source: Authors' regressions. For  output data, see table I. For  descriptions and sources of all other variables, see appendix 
A.  First reform year for a given country is the year of most intense reform from Aslund, Boone. and Johnson ( 1996). 
a. Dependent variable is total (official plus unofficial) GDP in 1995, scaled as an index, 1989 =  100. Regressions include 
fixed country effects.  Panel comprises fifteen countries: those listed in table I, excluding Belarus and Uzbekistan. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level;  t denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  Standard  errors are in parentheses. 
b. First reform year is year 0. 
c.  Natural log of the percent inflation rate in 1995. 
d. Unofficial output as a percentage of total output. 
that stabilization can lead to growth without depoliticization  and 
institution-building. 
Conclusions and Strategies for Reform 
This paper develops a simple framework  for understanding  the re- 
lationship between taxation and the provision of public goods in an 
economy, and puts forward several propositions about how tax and 
regulatory  policies affect the relative  size of the unofficial  economy and 
economic performance.  The economic transition  of formerly  commu- 
nist countries since 1989 offers an opportunity  to test this theory. The 
available  evidence broadly  supports  it. 
There are three types of transition  economies in eastern  Europe  and 
the former Soviet Union. First, there are politically repressed  econ- 
omies with highly distortionary  taxes, low provision of public goods, 
but still, a small unofficial sector; Belarus  and Uzbekistan  are striking 210  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
examples in our sample. Second, there are economies with relatively 
fair taxes, relatively light regulation,  high tax revenues, and relatively 
good provision of public goods in the official sector;  these are concen- 
trated in eastern Europe. Third, there are economies with relatively 
unfair  taxes, relatively onerous  regulation,  low tax collection, and rel- 
atively poor public goods; these are concentrated  in the former  Soviet 
Union. Comparing  the second and  third  groups, the former  has a lower 
share  of unofficial activity and faster economic growth  than the latter. 
These findings pinpoint the crucial difference between eastern Eu- 
rope  and  the former  Soviet Union in the progress  of institution-building. 
It widely agreed  that  over the next couple of decades, the east European 
economies will converge to west European  living standards.  The fate 
of the economies of the former  Soviet Union poses a tougher  question. 
In a pessimistic scenario, they would be stuck in a bad equilibrium  for 
a long time to come, with poor institutions,  a large  unofficial  economy, 
and an ineffective state. In a more optimistic scenario, appropriate 
policies would get these countries  out of a bad  equilibrium  and  set them 
on the growth  path  achieved  by the east European  countries.  The central 
policy question is how to make the second scenario come true. How 
can institutions  be built in the former  Soviet Union? 
One strategy is to draw on massive foreign assistance. Indeed, the 
IMF  has played a crucial  role in helping  Russia  achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization.  Nonetheless, foreign assistance  has not brought  Russia  to 
east European  institutional  standards.  Foreign  economic  assistance  does 
not, by itself, assure  the transition  to growth  through  improvements  in 
the budget situation. This is not a criticism, but rather,  a recognition 
that  the political environment  can lead to a very poor  rate  of conversion 
of money into public goods. 
Our  analysis suggests that  reforms  must  focus primarily  on the elim- 
ination  of the distortions  associated  with  existing government  activities, 
including tax collection, and on the effectiveness of the conversion of 
available public revenues into market-supporting  public goods. This 
approach  would correspond  to an upward  shift in the Q(T) function in 
our model, which, if large enough, can eliminate  the bad equilibrium. 
In the context of Russia, several reforms  that  correspond  to these strat- 
egies have been proposed.  These include  a tax reform  aimed  at increas- 
ing government  revenues  while reducing  marginal  tax rates  and simpli- 
fying tax rules;  revision of the federal  system, designed to improve  the Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  211 
incentives of  local governments to collect tax revenues and supply 
public goods; and improvements  in the provision of law and order.5 
Typically, the design of these institutional  reforms  is not very compli- 
cated. The question is whether  they are politically feasible. 
We believe that  there  is cause for optimism,  at least in some countries 
of the former  Soviet Union-most  notably, Russia. One reason is that 
with privatization  and macroeconomic  reforms  completed, there is rel- 
atively widespread agreement  about the necessity of institutional  re- 
forms. By contrast, in Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan  and 
Turkmenistan,  there is much less support  within the elite for essential 
public finance  reforms  and deregulation. 
In addition, Russia and some other countries in the former Soviet 
Union, such as Georgia  and  Azerbaijan,  have now achieved  a modicum 
of political stability  that  could ease the passage  of institutional  reforms. 
Boris Yeltsin was reelected  President  of Russia  in 1996, and  apparently 
remains committed to reform. To be sure, the government and the 
parliament  still have major  tactical disagreements  about  particular  pol- 
icies, and there is no guarantee  that the institutions  that emerge out of 
the political process  will be nearly  as market-friendly  as those in eastern 
Europe. 
Finally, it is worth noting that institutional  reform  is possible even 
in countries  with little history of functioning  market  institutions. Cer- 
tain East Asian countries  have achieved  such reforms  in relatively  short 
periods  of time. In Russia, as well, there  have been some considerable 
successes, such as the creation  of a stock market  and a legal infrastruc- 
ture supporting  financial  markets  and institutions. The lack of market 
history is an impediment  to institutional  reform, but it is not insur- 
mountable. 
To be sure, because so many  market-supporting  institutions  have yet 
to be set up and because many missteps are likely along the way, we 
do not expect Russia to achieve spectacular  growth in the near future. 
But it is important  to remember  that considerable  growth is possible 
without  institutional  perfection:  many  east European  countries  have had 
their own institutional  problems, as do many countries in the West. 
Reform  of the tremendously  distortionary  tax system will take Russia 
far along the path of reducing  the unofficial sector, increasing  govern- 
51.  For more  details, see Shleifer (1997a, 1997b). 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2 :1997 
ment revenues, and achieving growth. Russia is moving in the right 
direction  quite  rapidly,  by both its own and  comparative  standards.  This 
progress  gives cause for cautious  optimism  about  its economic, as well 
as its political, future. 
APPENDIX  A 
Measures  of Reform 
THIS  APPENDIX provides descriptions and sources of the various mea- 
sures of reform  that we use in the paper. 
Note that  although  the EBRD indexes are on a scale of 1 to 4*, there 
is no apparent  reason for using 4* rather  than 5.  As it says,  "most 
advanced economies would qualify for the 4* rating for almost all 
transition  indicators" (EBRD, 1996, p. 11, n. 1). We convert 4* to 5 
throughout. 
Parameter  t 
INTERNAL  LIBERALIZATION.  Liberalization  of  "internal  markets": 
price liberalization  and elimination  of state trading  monopolies. Scale 
is 0-1,  where higher score means more liberalized. 
Source: For 1989-94,  de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996, sect. 3); 
updated  for 1995 using unpublished  data provided  by Ratna Sahay of 
the IMF. 
EXTERNAL  LIBERALIZATION.  Extent  of  liberalization  in  "trade  and 
foreign exchange system."  Scale is  1-5.  Score is  1 if  "widespread 
import  and/or  export controls or very limited legitimate access to for- 
eign exchange"; 2 if "some liberalization  of import  and/or  export  con- 
trols; almost full current  account  convertibility  in principle  but with a 
foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent  (possibly with 
multiple exchange rates)"; 3 if  "removal of  most quantitative  and 
administrative  import and export restrictions;  almost full current  ac- 
count convertibility  at a unified exchange rate"; 4 if "removal of all 
quantitative  and administrative  import and export restrictions (apart 
from agriculture)  and all significant  export tariffs; insignificant  direct Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  213 
involvement  in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trad- 
ing companies; no major nonuniformity of customs duties for nonagri- 
cultural goods  and services";  and 5  if  "standards  and performance 
norms of advanced industrial countries: removal of most tariff barriers; 
membership in GATT/WTO [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/ 
World Trade Organization]." 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  (1995, 
table 2. 1, pp.  11,  12),  updated in EBRD (1996,  table 2. 1, p.  11). 
LARGE-SCALE  PRIVATIZATION.  Extent  to  which  large  state-owned 
firms have been privatized.  Scale is 1-5.  Score is 1 if "little progress"; 
2 if  "comprehensive  scheme  almost  ready for implementation;  some 
sales completed";  3 if "more than 25 percent of large-scale state-owned 
enterprise assets privatized or in the process of being sold,  but possibly 
with  major unresolved  issues  regarding corporate governance";  4  if 
"more than 50 percent of state-owned  enterprise assets privatized in a 
scheme  that has  generated  substantial outsider  ownership";  and 5  if 
"standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: 
more  than 75  percent  of  enterprise  assets  in private ownership  with 
effective  corporate governance." 
Source:  EBRD  (1995,  table  2.1,  pp.  11,  12),  updated  in  EBRD 
(1996,  table 2.1,  p.  11). 
TAX  FAIRNESS.  Scale is 0-10,  where higher score means fairer taxes. 
One of ten dimensions  on which a panel of experts graded twenty-six 
transition countries  "for  their attractiveness  as a place  to do business 
over the coming  year."  A reasonable interpretation is that the experts 
took into account both tax rates and the quality of tax administration. 
For more details,  see appendix B. 
Source: Central  European  Economic  Review,  "The  Great Growth 
Race,"  December  1995-January  1996,  pp.  8-9,  13 (published  as  a 
supplement to the Wall Street Journal Europe). 
CRIME  AND  CORRUPTION.  Scale  is 0-10,  where  higher score  means 
less crime and corruption. One of ten dimensions  used to grade twenty- 
six transition countries for their attractiveness as a place to do business 
over the coming  year. For more details,  see appendix B. 
Source: CEER, "The Great Growth Race,"  December  1995-January 
1996, pp. 8-9,  13. 
REGULATION.  Our scale,  which  reverses  the Heritage  Foundation's 
original scale,  is 0-4,  where a higher score means less regulation. Score 214  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
is 4 ("very  low")  if free of corruption, existing regulations are straight- 
forward and applied  uniformly  to all  businesses,  regulations  are not 
much  of  a burden to  business;  3  ("low")  if  licensing  procedure  is 
simple,  no  bribes,  existing  regulations  are relatively  straightforward 
and applied uniformly most of the time, regulations prove to be a burden 
to business  in some  instances;  2 ("moderate")  if existing  regulations 
may be applied haphazardly and in some  instances  are not even  pub- 
lished by the government,  complicated licensing procedure, regulations 
are a substantial burden to business,  a significant  state-owned  sector 
exists,  no bribes; 1 ("high")  if government-set  production quotas and 
state planning,  major barriers to opening a business,  complicated licen- 
sing process,  very high fees,  bribes sometimes  necessary,  regulations 
a great burden to  business;  and 0  ("very  high")  if  government  dis- 
courages new business  creation, bribes mandatory, regulations applied 
randomly. 
Source:  Heritage  Foundation,  published  in  Johnson  and  Sheehy 
(1996). 
Variable Q 
LEGAL  SAFEGUARDS.  Scale  is 0-10,  where higher score means better 
legal safeguards.  One of ten dimensions  used to grade twenty-six  tran- 
sition  countries  for their attractiveness  as a place  to do business  over 
the coming  year. For more details,  see appendix B. 
Source: CEER, "The Great Growth Race,"  December 1995-January 
1996,  pp. 8-9,  13. 
RULE  OF  LAW.  Scale is 0-10,  where higher score means stronger rule 
of law. One of ten dimensions  used to grade twenty-six  transition coun- 
tries for their attractiveness  as a place to do business  over the coming 
year. For more details,  see appendix B. 
Source: CEER, "The Great Growth Race,"  December 1995-January 
1996,  pp. 8-9,  13. 
LEGAL  EFFECTIVENESS.  "The  effectiveness  of  legal  rules on invest- 
ment."  Scale is 1-5.  Score is 1 if "legal  rules are usually very unclear 
and often contradictory and the availability of independent legal advice 
is very limited.  The administration of the law is substantially deficient 
(for example,  little confidence  in the abilities  and independence  of the 
courts, no or poorly organized security and land registers)";  2 if "legal Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  215 
rules are usually unclear and sometimes  contradictory.  Legal advice  is 
often difficult to obtain. The administration and judicial  support of the 
law is rudimentary";  3 if  "legal  rules are reasonably clear and ascer- 
tainable through legal advice  [but] administrative or judicial  support is 
often inadequate (for example,  substantial discretion in the administra- 
tion of  laws,  few  up-to-date  registers);  4 if  "law  is usually  clear and 
legal  advice  is readily available.  Investment laws  are reasonably well 
administered and supported judicially,  although that support is some- 
times  patchy";  and 5  if  "law  is  clear  and readily  ascertainable.  So- 
phisticated  legal  advice  is  readily  available.  Investment  law  is  well 
supported  administratively  and judicially,  particularly regarding  the 
efficient  functioning  of  courts and the orderly and timely  registration 
of proprietary or security interests." 
Source: EBRD  (1995,  table 6.1,  p.  103); updated in EBRD  (1996, 
box 2. 1, p.  14). 
LEGAL  EXTENSIVENESS.  "The  extensiveness  of legal rules on invest- 
ment."  Scale  is  1-5.  Score  is  1 if  "legal  rules  are very  limited  in 
scope,  and impose  substantial constraints on creating investment vehi- 
cles,  security  over  assets  or to the repatriation of  profits.  Indirect in- 
vestment is not specifically  regulated";  2 if "legal  rules are limited in 
scope  and impose  significant  constraints on creating investment  vehi- 
cles,  adequate security over assets,  or the repatriation of profits";  3 if 
"legal  rules do not impose  major obstacles  to creating investment  ve- 
hicles  and security  or to repatriating profits [but] they are in need of 
considerable  improvements";  4 if "legal  rules do not discriminate be- 
tween  foreign  and domestic  investors  and impose  few  constraints  on 
creating a range of investment vehicles  and security instruments. Indi- 
rect investment is specifically  regulated";  and 5 if "legal  rules closely 
approximate generally  accepted  standards internationally  and impose 
few restrictions,  including  on the creation of sophisticated  investment 
vehicles  or security.  Indirect investment  law is well  developed." 
Source: EBRD  (1995,  table 6.1,  p.  103); updated in EBRD  (1996, 
box 2. 1, p.  14). 
Stabilization  Policy 
FISCAL  BALANCE.  Budget  deficit  as  a percentage  of  official  GDP, 
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Source:  Unpublished  data provided  by  Ratna Sahay  of  the  IMF. 
Fischer,  Sahay,  and Vegh  (1996a,  1996b)  use  an earlier  version  of 
these data 
INFLATION.  Annual change in the consumer price index (using annual 
averages). 
Source:  Unpublished  data provided  by  Ratna Sahay  of  the  IMF. 
Fischer,  Sahay,  and Vegh  (1996a,  1996b)  use  an earlier  version  of 
these data 
Political  Liberalization 
POLITICAL  RIGHTS.  "Political  rights  enable  people  to  participate 
freely  in  the  political  process  .  .  .  the  system  by  which  the  polity 
chooses  the authoritative policy  makers and attempts to make binding 
decisions  affecting  the national,  regional,  or local community."  Free- 
dom House's  original scale is  1-7  (that is,  most liberal to most repres- 
sive).  We recalculate  on a scale  of 0-6,  where a higher score is more 
liberal. 
Source:  Freedom  House,  "The  Comparative  Survey  of  Freedom 
1995-96,"  pp.  2-3  (available  on the Freedom House worldwide  web 
page). 
CIVIL  LIBERTIES.  "The  freedoms  to develop  views,  institutions  and 
personal  autonomy  apart from the state."  Freedom House's  original 
scale  is  1-7  (that is,  most liberal to most repressive).  We recalculate 
on a scale  of 0-6,  where a higher score is more liberal. 
Source:  Freedom  House,  "The  Comparative  Survey  of  Freedom 
1995-96,"  pp.  2-3  (available  on the Freedom House worldwide  web 
page). 
POLITICAL  PROCESS.  "Deals  with elections  and referenda, party con- 
figuration, conditions  for political  competition,  and popular participa- 
tion in elections."  Freedom House's  original scale is 1-7  (that is, most 
liberal to most repressive).  We recalculate on a scale of 0-6,  where a 
higher score is more liberal. 
Source: Freedom House,  published in Shor (1997). 
RULE OF LAW.  "Considers judicial and constitutional matters, as well 
as the legal and de facto status of ethnic minorities."  Freedom House's Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei  Shleifer  217 
original  scale  is  1-7  (that  is,  most  liberal  to  most  repressive).  We 
recalculate  on a scale of 0-6,  where a higher score is more liberal. 
Source: Freedom House,  published in Shor (1997). 
APPENDIX  B 
The Central  European  Economic Review Ratings 
IN ITS  RATINGS  of transition economies,  the Central  European  Economic 
Review (published  as a supplement of the Wall Street Journal Europe) 
has changed both the composition  of its panel of experts and the ques- 
tions  asked  over  the  years.  In the  February 1995  issue,  when  these 
ratings first appeared,  the CEER "asked  the panelists  to rate each  of 
the twenty-five  countries on ten categories  reflecting their capacity for 
development  through the year 2000.  Grades were given on a scale of 0 
to  10,  with  10 the highest  possible  mark, on the basis of the analysts 
judgment of the countries state five years from now.  An average of the 
results is presented, along with a cumulative average for each country. " 
The panel comprised  Dirk W.  Damrau (Salomon  Brothers,  London), 
Susanne  Gahler  (JP Morgan  & Co.,  London),  Andreas  Gummich 
(Deutsche  Bank, Frankfurt), Jonathan Hoffman (CS First Boston,  Lon- 
don),  James  Lister-Cheese  (Independent  Strategy,  London),  Philip 
Poole  (ING Bank, London),  Jan Vanous (PlanEcon,  Washington),  and 
Werner Varga (Creditanstalt-Bankverein,  Vienna).  The ten categories 
were economic  growth, price stability,  political  stability,  currency sta- 
bility,  privatization,  infrastructure,  productivity,  legal  framework, 
trade prospects,  and natural resources.  Because  the panel was looking 
forward five years,  these  measures do not seem  very reliable  as indi- 
cators  of  how  the  panel  viewed  the  past  and current situation,  and 
therefore we do not use any in this paper. 
In the December  1995-January  1996  issue,  the CEER "asked  our 
panel  to  rank each  of  the  twenty-six  countries  on  the  basis  of  their 
attractiveness  as a place to do business  over the coming  year.  Grades 
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score."  On the panel,  Peter Havlik  (Vienna  Institute for Comparative 
Economic Studies) and Donald Green (PlanEcon, Washington) replaced 
Philip Poole and Jan Vanous. The ten categories were economic  growth, 
price stability,  currency stability,  legal safeguards, productivity,  infra- 
structure, ease of portfolio investment,  banking system,  corruption and 
crime, and tax burden. Because the questions asked this year were more 
precise,  we  use  three of  these  measures: legal  safeguards,  corruption 
and crime,  and tax burden. 
For the December  1996-January  1997  issue,  the CEER appears to 
have  made  the  same  general  request  of  the panel  as  in the previous 
year: "We  asked our panel to rank each of the regions countries on the 
basis of their attractiveness  as a place to do business  over the coming 
year."  This panel differed from the previous year's in that Dirk Damrau 
and Donald Green were replaced by Dan Lubash (Merrill Lynch,  Lon- 
don) and Miranda Xafa (Salomon Brothers International, London); thus 
five of the original  1995 panel remained: Gahler, Gummich,  Hoffman, 
Lister-Cheese,  and Varga.  Only  seven  categories  were  offered:  eco- 
nomic growth, price stability, integration into world economy,  currency 
stability,  rule of  law,  ease  of  portfolio  investment,  and productivity. 
Of these,  we use rule of law,  because it may contain some information 
that is not revealed  in the previous assessments. 
APPENDIX  C 
Alternative  Evaluations of the Legal Environment 
SINCE WE ARE particularly interested in the legal environment of reform- 
ing countries,  it is useful to look at how the various available measures 
compare  in  their  ratings  of  countries.  An  interesting  comparison  is 
possible  for the countries  of  the former Soviet  Union,  in particular, 
because the IMF provides a measure of institutional development  at the 
end of  1994.  This can serve as a cross-check  of the indexes that we use 
in our regressions.  Table Cl  compares measures of the legal  environ- 
ment from the IMF, the EBRD,  and the CEER. 
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"substantial"  progress  in terms of  fiscal  consolidation,  privatization 
and land restitution,  government and institutional reform, legal frame- 
work,  social  safety  net,  and trade liberalization.  Intermediate ratings 
are also  allowed  (for example,  moderate-substantial),  so  they  essen- 
tially  use a 5 point scale,  similar to that of the EBRD. 
The  EBRD  measures  are generally  well  documented  and easy  to 
understand.  The  most  notable  exception  is  the  case  of  Ukraine,  for 
which the "legal  effectiveness"  rating (see appendix A) was increased 
from 2 to 4  between  1995  and  1996-a  surprising shift,  not easy  to 
confirm from the EBRD's  qualitative assessment. 
Table C I shows that the IMF ratings clearly differ from those of the 
EBRD  and the CEER. This  may be due,  in part, to the timing  of  the 
evaluations,  but it may also reflect unspecified differences in the criteria 
used.  Despite  considerable  variation in the absolute  values  assigned, 
however,  the series are quite consistent in terms of the relative rankings 
of the countries. 
APPENDIX  D 
General Government  Spending 
TABLE  Di reports government spending as a percentage of official  GDP 
as given in European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  (1996). 
Unfortunately,  the EBRD does not give  these numbers for Russia,  but 
Cheasty and Davis  (1996)  provide a comparable estimate; the Cheasty 
and Davis series is similar-generally  within 1 or 2 percentage points- 
for almost all the former Soviet  countries included in the EBRD series. 
The estimates for government spending as a percentage of total GDP 
are obtained by multiplying the EBRD estimate for each country by our 
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and Discussion 
Marshall  I.  Goldman:  Economists  have  long  recognized  the impor- 
tance of the underground or unofficial economy  in capitalist society  and 
sought  ways  to diminish  its role.  Simon  Johnson,  Daniel  Kaufmann, 
and Andrei Shleifer  relate these concerns  to the transition economies. 
They argue that the more onerous the taxes and regulations,  the poorer 
the availability  of official  sector public goods,  and the weaker the rule 
of law,  the larger is the unofficial economy.  In turn, a large unofficial 
economy  hampers  overall  economic  growth,  which  spawns  an even 
larger  unofficial  sector.  The  depoliticization  of  economic  life  is  an 
important step toward creating the proper climate for the formation and 
operation of legitimate  private businesses. 
It is hard to take issue  with the authors' general conclusions.  How- 
ever,  there may well be alternative explanations  for some of their find- 
ings.  I argue for a different approach and try to show that too zealous 
an effort  at depoliticization  and too  great an emphasis  on  achieving 
rapid economic  stabilization  may be counterproductive  and skew  the 
transition process. 
In designing  their regression,  the authors consider various indepen- 
dent variables that undoubtedly do play a role in determining economic 
growth and driving businessmen  to the unofficial  economy.  However, 
as  an  old-time  Sovietologist,  a  much  simpler  explanation  comes  to 
mind: the number of years that a country has spent under communism 
and whether its culture (a bad word) is supportive or hostile  to market 
activities.  The  point  is  illustrated  by  table  El,  which  shows  annual 
percentage change in GDP for selected countries in eastern Europe and 
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Table El.  Changes  in Official  GDP, Selected  Transition  Economies,  1991-96 
Percent 
Country  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Central and eastern 
Europe 
Bulgaria  -12.7  -10.7  0.8  4.2  2.4  -10.1 
Czech  Republic  .  .  .  -4.1  1.0  5.6  5.0  4.4 
Hungary  -6.8  -0.6  1.3  6.1  1.5  0.6 
Poland  -7.6  5.3  6.1  8.3  6.5  6.0 
Romania  -12.9  -4.9  4.3  8.6  5.4  4.1 
Slovakia  .  .  .  0.8  -2.5  8.4  6.0  6.9 
Former Soviet Union 
Estonia  -11.0  .  .  .  -8.5  -2.7  2.9  4.0 
Latvia  -10.4  -34.9  -14.9  6.0  -1.6  2.8 
Lithuania  .  .  .  .  .  .  -30.4  1.0  2.6  3.6 
Armenia  -11.7  -41.8  -8.6  5.4  6.9  5.8 
Azerbaijan  -0.7  -22.6  -23.3  -19.7  -12.0  1.3 
Georgia  -21.1  -44.9  -29.3  8.7  3.3  11.2 
Belarus  -1.2  -9.6  -7.6  -12.6  -10.4  2.6 
Kazakhstan  -11.0  -5.3  -10.6  -12.6  -8.2  1.1 
Kyrgyzstan  -7.8  -13.9  -15.6  -20.1  -5.4  5.6 
Moldava  -17.5  -29.0  -1.2  -30.9  -1.9  -8.0 
Russia  -5.0  -14.5  -8.7  -12.6  -4.1  -4.9 
Tajikistan  . ..  .  .  -  17.3  -  12.7  -  12.4  -  16.7 
Turkmenistan  ...  ...  7.8  -24.0  -10.0  0.1 
Ukraine  -8.7  -9.9  -  14.2  -22.9  -  12.8  -  10.0 
Uzbekistan  -0.5  -11.1  -2.3  -4.2  -1.2  1.6 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from U.S.  Central Intelligence Agency (1996);  World Bank (1996a); and 
"Economies of Countries of the CIS,'  a document available to subscribers  on the worldwide web page of Internet  Securities, 
1997. 
the former Soviet Union.  The various reporting agencies  offer different 
estimates  of  GDP growth,  but these do not seem  to affect  the overall 
trends.  The  countries  surveyed  fall  into three distinct  groups.  In the 
first are the countries of central and eastern Europe, almost all of which 
began to report positive  economic  growth in  1993,  three years (in the 
case  of  Poland,  two  years)  after the start of  reform.  These  countries 
endured at most forty-five  years of communism. 
The  second  category  includes  the  former  Soviet  republics  in  the 
Baltic  and Caucasus  regions.  Although  a bit more erratic,  their eco- 
nomic growth began in  1994.  The Baltics  had communist  regimes  for 
approximately as long as did eastern Europe. The three countries of the 
Caucasus were communist for seventy years, but there is general agree- 224  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
ment that throughout the period the underground economy  was  much 
more  active  in  this  region  than almost  anywhere  else  in  the  former 
Soviet Union.  Traders selling regional products often came to dominate 
collective  farm markets in other parts of the Soviet Union.  The fact that 
the climate  in the Caucasus  is well  suited to growing  vegetables  and 
fruits provided traders from this region  with an important advantage. 
As  a consequence,  the  culture-or  ethos-of  the  Caucasus  encom- 
passed relatively  more nonstate economic  activity,  both unofficial  and 
legal. 
The  third category  comprises  all the Slavic  and the Central Asian 
countries  from the former Soviet  Union.  With the exception  of  Mol- 
dava,  these  were  communist  for at least  seventy  years and,  with  the 
exception  of  a single  year in Turkmenistan,  all had negative  rates of 
growth  from  1991  through  1995.  In some-including  Russia  and 
Ukraine-GDP  will continue to decline through 1997,  five to six years 
after the start of  reform and four to five years after the turnaround in 
eastern Europe.  In other words,  the longer a country was ruled by the 
communists,  the longer it takes to recoup and resume economic  growth. 
This simple  variable may be as, or more, powerful  a predictor than 
those  used by the authors in their more complicated  model.  There are 
several  reasons  for this.  After the collapse  of  the communist  govern- 
ments in eastern Europe,  familiarity with market ways  of doing  busi- 
ness,  for the most part, was easily and quickly reestablished.  Forty-five 
years had been a long time,  but there were still many who remembered 
how  the old  system  operated.  For that matter, in the communist  era 
several  of  the  east  European countries  took  a  more  benign  attitude 
toward the  market,  private  farms,  and private business  than did  the 
Soviet  Union.  In the extreme  case  of Poland,  80 to 85 percent of  the 
farms were  never collectivized,  and the state always  allowed  a small 
private  service  sector.  Even  though  not  everyone  in  eastern  Europe 
could engage in market activities  for themselves,  because of their prox- 
imity to the West they could  more readily observe  the nuances of the 
market. The additional twenty-five  years of communist  control in the 
Soviet Union destroyed virtually all memory and institutional remnants 
of  the previous  economic  system  and made the restoration of  market 
infrastructure significantly  more difficult and time-consuming.  (In their 
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age done  in countries  that had an additional generation of communist 
government.) 
Table El  also has some  important implications  for the depoliticiza- 
tion of  the economy.  In principle,  there is no quarrel with depolitici- 
zation  that brings  "regulatory  and tax relief,  reduction  in corruption 
[and] the elimination  of  subsidies."  However,  in the countries  where 
communism  lasted the longest,  it has been essential  not only to destroy 
(depoliticize)  some  controls  and taxes,  but at the same time  or even 
earlier  to  construct  (politicize)  a market infrastructure. Because  de- 
struction of the market environment was so much more thorough in the 
Soviet Union-indeed,  the market was not all that well developed under 
the czars-the  reform process under Yeltsin  began in a near vacuum. I 
There were no commercial codes,  bankruptcy laws,  commercial courts, 
judges,  or market accounting standards, nor the informal behavior pat- 
terns that temper the extremes  of the unfettered market. More impor- 
tant, there were no competitive  markets. Before businesses  can operate 
normally and before governments can provide the services  that authors 
feel  are necessary,  these institutions have to be reestablished. 
Not all of these elements  were present in eastern Europe either (al- 
though many were),  but given  the memory of  institutions  past,  those 
that had existed previously were reconstituted with relative ease.  It was 
a serious  mistake-if  not folly-to  ignore  the lack  of  any such  pre- 
existing  infrastructure in most of the former Soviet Union, or to assume 
that it could be quickly created simply by privatizing state industry. It 
is true that "the Russian people,  like the rest of the people in the world, 
[are] 'economic  men' who rationally [respond] to incentives,"  and they 
are not  lacking  in entrepreneurial ability.2  But  if  there is  no  market 
infrastructure, no market competition,  and none of the checks and bal- 
ances that evolve  over the years to temper the economic  dominance of 
one group or another, then economic  men, including Russians,  will act 
in asocial  ways-particularly  so if the reform process does  not antici- 
pate and seek to mitigate their excesses. 
In retrospect,  one should not have been surprised by the growth of 
the mafia in the former Soviet  Union,  nor of bandit capitalism  so un- 
1. On the czarist  era, see Owen (1991, p. 209). 
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controlled  that one  leading  banker-politician  has  asserted  that seven 
bankers control 50 percent of the country's  economy.3  A bit exagger- 
ated perhaps, but not too far from the mark if one includes the directors 
of  Gazprom,  the  world's  largest  gas  producer,  and Lukoil,  with  oil 
reserves greater than those of Exxon.  To privatize the larger monopo- 
listic state enterprises in the absence of prophylactic mechanisms,  such 
as market competition  or effective  antitrust legislation,  was  like  im- 
porting the melaleuca,  an Australian tree, to dry out part of the Florida 
Everglades.4  Without  the natural predators that contain  its growth in 
Australia,  this tree,  like the privatized monopolies  and big bankers in 
Russia,  has threatened to overwhelm  its new environment.  The mela- 
leuca already covers  about 7 percent of the Everglades. 
In much the same way,  the seven bankers are using their control not 
only of so much of the economy  but also of the media to bully govern- 
ment officials  at the very highest level.  Allied  for a time, these bankers 
are now  feuding  among  themselves  and,  in the process,  resurrecting 
old Soviet  techniques  of slander-and  on occasion,  physical  intimida- 
tion.  When added to the pervasive  role of the mafia,  a capricious  tax 
system,  and corrupt government officials,  these practices have made it 
more difficult  to start new businesses  in the former Soviet  Union than 
it was five years ago. 
As important as it may be to privatize state enterprises,  even higher 
priority should be given to fostering the growth of new start-up traders, 
farmers, and businesses.  Simultaneously,  commercial codes,  laws,  and 
courts should be reinvented.  But that is not enough.  The hard part is to 
ensure that the laws and codes  become  operational.  In the best case of 
transition, the emphasis in Poland was on start-ups and the development 
and  implementation  of  new  behavioral  codes;  in  the  former  Soviet 
Union (Russia,  in particular) the emphasis was on privatization and the 
passage  of,  but not adherence to,  new  laws.  This is one of  the major 
reasons why the mafia and business monopolies  are so much less dom- 
inant and adherence to codes  and the law is so much more prominent 
3.  The banker-politician  is Boris Berezovsky, in Chrysta  Freeland,  John  Thornhill, 
and Andrew  Gowers, "Moscow's Group  of Seven: Chrysta  Freeland,  John Thornhill, 
and Andrew Gowers on the Business Leaders Shaping Russia's Future," Financial 
Times, November 1, 1996, p. 17. 
4.  Mireya Navarro, "U.S.  Dispatches an Army of Tree-Hungry  Beetles to Fight 
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in Poland and most of the rest of eastern Europe than it is in Russia and 
the rest of the former Soviet  Union.5 
The overriding fixation with privatization in the former Soviet Union 
has,  in some  ways,  been  matched by  a fervent  determination  to halt 
inflation. The authors note that in Russia stabilization did not bring with 
it the economic  recovery  that it did in eastern Europe.  They  caution 
that it is  difficult  to determine  whether the failure  to grow  is  due to 
stabilization  policy  (perhaps too slow)  or depoliticization  and deregu- 
lation (not far reaching enough).  I would argue that, as in the case  of 
privatization,  there was too much emphasis on tight money and credit 
at a time when existing  rules and regulations were either inadequate or 
nonfunctioning.  The absence of meaningful bankruptcy procedures has 
been particularly important. High real interest rates have been a factor 
in the cash crisis that prevails throughout the former Soviet Union,  the 
continuing  decline  in direct capital investment,  and the growth of the 
banking giants (I would hate to think what might have happened if the 
effort to reduce inflation had been even more draconian). 
I also  have  some  comments  about the  authors'  regression  model. 
First, they surely do not want more Q (the quantity of the public good), 
as they  seem  to indicate  in equation  1. Even if it is assured that this 
would  bring good  government,  it would  also  mean big  government, 
which would crowd start-ups in the private sector. 
Second,  the authors assume that all the political institutions described 
in appendix A are in place.  However,  that does  not necessarily  mean 
that they are commonly  accepted or part of the culture. Similarly,  while 
the emphasis  on  depoliticization  evidenced  in this  appendix  is  to be 
applauded, politicization  is necessary  as well  in those countries where 
the market framework and its formal and informal codes must be refur- 
bished or reintroduced. 
Third, a variable that is important in explaining  economic  growth, 
or its absence,  is the level  of prereform expenditures  on the military- 
industrial complex.  Such expenditures  were high throughout the com- 
munist  bloc,  and  especially  so  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  where, 
according  to  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  military  expenditures  constituted 
20 percent of GNP during the 1980s.6 In consequence,  conversion  has 
5.  Frye and Shleifer (1997, p. 357). 
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been  very  difficult  for  the  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union;  in 
particular,  for Russia,  where  the proportion of  industry dedicated  to 
military production under communism  in many cities exceeded  50 per- 
cent-in  Irkutsk, for example,  it may have been as high as 80 percent. 
Slashing  budget expenditures  has posed an additional burden on those 
areas, which helps to explain why Moscow  grew at close  to 10 percent 
a year in 1996,  while Novosibirsk  was shrinking by 15 percent a year. 
The  authors recognize  the extraordinary role  played  by  the military- 
industrial complex,  and that its sudden contraction can result in "dis- 
ruption of trade."  More important, it also led to a sudden collapse  of 
industrial  production  that is  not  explained  by  the  variables  that the 
authors use to understand relative differences  in the recovery of GDP. 
Fourth, Belarus  and Uzbekistan  do not seem  to fit the model  com- 
fortably.  The authors speculate  that this may be due to the repressive 
nature of the regimes in these two countries.  Specifically,  they suggest 
that repression may explain the lack of activity in the unofficial sector. 
That may be true about Belarus,  which has not been noted as a center 
of either official  or unofficial  trade. However,  it is not true of Uzbek- 
istan, which was a center of unofficial trading in the prereform era and, 
from most reports of visitors to the region,  continues to be. Thus there 
is a strong likelihood  that the Uzbek data used by the authors is inac- 
curate, or that Uzbekistan  presents a very different situation,  or both. 
Fifth,  the model  also suggests  that if a government is weak,  mafia- 
type operations  may come  to dominate,  so that the unofficial  sector is 
able to protect itself  and generate increasing  returns. The implication 
is that there is then no limit to such growth. But this ignores the restraint 
that  such  a  regime  would  most  likely  encounter  from  international 
sources.  That is not to say that there could never be a bandit regime- 
only that its growth would sooner or later be circumscribed by outside 
pressures. Likewise,  a good government that manages to hold down the 
unofficial sector will still face random acts from mafia groups. It is hard 
to find governments  in the world today,  even  the best run, that have 
eliminated  all mafia-type activities. 
Sixth,  the authors recognize  the difficulty of determining whether to 
use  a  unit  elasticity  calculation  or  one  that is  higher  or  lower.  To 
complicate  their task,  it seems  likely  that to the extent there are new 
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Table  E2.  Changes in Electricity  Usage and Official  GDP, Russia, 1991-96 
Percent 
Item  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Electricity  usage  -1.3  -5.7  -5.1  -8.5  -1.8  -1.5 
Official  GDP  -5.0  -14.5  -8.7  -12.6  -4.1  -4.9 
Source: Author's calculations.  Electricity data for  1991-95  are from Goskomstat Rossii  (1996);  for  1996,  from the 
worldwide web page of Goskomstat Rossii.  GDP data are from table El. 
cient than the former state enterprises,  so that an elasticity  of less  than 
one might be more suitable. 
Finally,  the  authors take electricity  generation  as a more accurate 
measure of overall output, but this does not lead to the conclusion-at 
least,  not for Russia-that  GDP has been  increasing.  As table E2 in- 
dicates,  Russian  electric  power  has  declined  each  year  since  1991, 
although generally by less than GDP. In the first half of 1997, however, 
electricity  generation  dropped by 4.4  percent,  whereas the decline  in 
GDP was only 0.2  percent. 
The authors conclude that unfair taxation and heavy regulation cause 
the unofficial  sector to grow,  and that this leads to low tax collections 
and poor  public  goods  in the  official  sector,  which  together  impede 
economic  growth.  However,  that should  not blind one  to even  more 
basic considerations  that are crucial to the transition process.  The pur- 
poseful  attack on market institutions for over seventy  years in most of 
the former Soviet Union meant that those countries began the transition 
process  a full stage of development  behind most of eastern Europe. A 
completely  new institutional,  legal,  and competitive  framework has to 
be reinvented  before  healthy  growth can be expected.  Moreover,  not 
only  is  depoliticization  of  the  economy  a necessary  prerequisite  for 
growth,  so is politicization-that  is,  the creation and establishment  of 
a traditional market and legal framework. The failure to recognize  such 
a first step has resulted in what some have described as bandit capital- 
ism.  While  there have recently  been  signs  that some  new leaders  are 
determined to correct some of the grosser excesses,  their task will  not 
be easy,  to say the least.  Undoing the damage wrought by the mistaken 
policies  that were initially  adopted may prolong the process. 
Future historians looking  back at the transition process in the coun- 
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four years that they needed was,  after all,  a relatively  short time.  That 
may be so.  However,  even  if Ukraine and Russia do begin to grow at 
a healthy rate, they will be left with a legacy of theft and criminality in 
the business  sector  and the feeling  that the population  has  suffered. 
These matters are certain to haunt the reform effort for years to come. 
Martin  L.  Weitzman:  This  ambitious  study  has,  as  most  ambitious 
studies  do,  a  theoretical  model  as  its  centerpiece.  In broad generic 
terms, this paper's model is of the increasing returns, multiple equilib- 
ria,  big  push  form.  There  are essentially  two  kinds  of  competition. 
"Good"  competition  is  identified  with  a  small  unofficial  economy, 
whereas  "bad"  competition  occurs  when  there  is  a  large  unofficial 
economy.  Although  this  part of  the  model  is  not  really  spelled  out 
precisely,  bad competition  is bad and good competition is good because 
the  official  sector  is  presumed  to  be  more  productive  at generating 
public goods  than the mafia. 
The  model  is  so  constructed  that an economy  can  either  be  in  a 
"good"  equilibrium with good competition  or be in a "bad"  equilib- 
rium with bad competition.  The good equilibrium is a virtuous circle, 
in which the government offers a sufficiently  attractive combination of 
tax rates, regulations,  and public goods  that a preponderance of  firms 
chooses  to  stay  in the official  sector,  thereby generating  a source  of 
government  tax  revenues  to  provide  the  public  goods  and allow  the 
government  to outcompete  the unofficial  sector-a  postitive  feedback 
system.  Conversely,  a bad equilibrium is a vicious  circle,  in which the 
government  cannot  offer  a sufficiently  attractive combination  of  tax 
rates, regulations,  and public goods to make it in firms' self-interest  to 
operate in the official  sector,  and so they move to the unofficial  sector, 
thereby completing  the negative  feedback loop by denying the govern- 
ment sufficient  tax revenues. 
Which  equilibrium  an economy  ends up in depends on initial con- 
ditions  and what is assumed about the underlying dynamic adjustment 
mechanism.  But whatever the initial conditions  and economic  dynam- 
ics,  the model  predicts certain correlations between  variables that are 
endogenously  determined  by  whether they  are in a good  or in a bad 
equilibrium.  Johnson,  Kauffman,  and Shleifer  look  at transition as a 
kind of natural experiment,  where a number of countries were cut loose 
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sorted by history-into  one of the two equilibrium states.  A test of the 
theory would then be to look at the data and see if the predicted final- 
state correlations have actually occurred. 
This  suggests  one  problem  right away.  In the  pure model  of  this 
framework, there are no genuine exogenous  differences.  All countries 
are essentially  identical;  they just happen to end up in one of the two 
equilibria, according to their initial conditions  and dynamic adjustment 
mechanisms.  But suppose that there are exogenous  differences  between 
countries. Suppose that one cannot observe or quantify these exogenous 
differences  very well,  but that they are correlated in a complicated  way 
with the supposedly  endogenously  determined differences,  which one 
can observe.  Suppose,  also,  that rather than only two possible  discrete 
equilibria, there is (more realistically)  a continuum of equilibria.  Then 
it is a potentially very messy  statistical problem to unscramble whether 
the theory holds,  because  one could be seeing  associations  among the 
observed  variables  that are formed  for reasons  other than those  pre- 
dicted by the theory.  My sense  is that in this case the data are replete 
with  such  problems.  The  authors make  a brave  attempt at inserting 
dummy variables strategically,  but I wonder how much action this picks 
up and how legitimate  it is statistically,  done on such an ad hoc basis. 
Even without this problem of identifying  the source of variation, the 
authors are faced  with  a statistical  headache of  enormous magnitude. 
Most of the predictions  involve,  either directly or indirectly,  variables 
that are nonstandard in one  way or another: the size  of  the unofficial 
economy,  the degree of corruption, the legal environment,  and so forth 
and so  on.  This  is  not the fault  of  the authors; the area is just  very 
difficult to research.  As  one example,  take the share of the unofficial 
economy.  The authors use some very rough estimates to fix initial levels 
and then use  an electricity-consumption-based  methodology  to  track 
changes across time. 
It would be easy to spend time taking potshots at this kind of meth- 
odology  because  it offers  a big,  fat target. The real questions here are, 
first, what are the alternatives? And second,  when all is said and done, 
can anything meaningful be salvaged from what seems like a statistical 
morass? 
The first question is easy to answer,  because there is no good quan- 
titative alternative.  The qualitative alternative is to look at things a bit 
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The second  question  is more difficult.  Given  all of the data problems 
and given  the misspecifications  of multicausal  links that are undoubt- 
edly rampant in an exercise  of this nature, can one confidently conclude 
anything about causality  here from running a lot of regressions?  I fear 
that this  kind  of  study  may  be  very  close  to  the  edge.  The  authors 
conclude that the available evidence  broadly supports the model frame- 
work, but I am really not sure whether I would believe  this on the basis 
of the regressions  that they run. 
What do researchers in other fields do when confronted with impor- 
tant questions  that are difficult to answer cleanly  because  the world is 
a multicausal mess and the right data are not available? The best analogy 
that I can think of  is in the field of medical  statistics.  There are thou- 
sands of  striking patterns in the incidence  of  disease  that no one can 
fully explain.  For example,  there is apparently a statistically  significant 
correlation between  household  ownership of microwave  ovens  and the 
incidence  of cataracts, which remains even after controlling for the few 
other household  variables  for which  data also  exist.  It could  be  that 
microwave  use  is  some  kind of  a causal  agent  for cataracts,  or that 
people  who are prone to be diagnosed with cataracts are more likely to 
own  microwave  ovens  for some  as-yet-unknown  reason whose  causal 
mechanism  is hidden.  No one is sure. In such a case,  I think that if the 
result holds  up when one throws whatever other variables one has on 
one's  data tape into the regressions,  and if it fits in with one's  precon- 
ceived  notions  of what might be going  on,  one warns the public to be 
cautious about staring into a working microwave oven from half an inch 
away. 
I guess the same strategy applies in this study of the unofficial econ- 
omy  in transition.  One is told that the results do not come  apart under 
alternative specifications  or when using somewhat different data. That 
is,  what might better be called the controlled correlations in this study 
are supposed  to be stable.  (I take the authors' word on this important 
aspect,  since  only  they can know.)  At a high level  of abstraction,  the 
model  and most  of  the controlled  correlations  fit in with my precon- 
ceived  notions of what is going on. So,  I am probably more inclined to 
believe  than to disbelieve  the results.  But convincing  econometrics- 
econometrics  that convincingly  establishes  causality-this  is not. 
I do believe  that the spiritual message  of this paper is both correct 
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competition)  is a kind of global optimum that is not, however,  globally 
stable along the way.  That is,  if one gets there one is better off than in 
the alternative; but to do so one has to follow  a particular path, along 
which one will not necessarily  be improving every step of the way,  nor 
be better off  than the alternatives every  step of  the way.  To see  why 
this may be so,  look back to the original "transition,"  when capitalism 
emerged from feudalism. 
The  OECD-level  countries  at present  consist  of  western  Europe; 
former British colonies,  where the native population was suppressed or 
was  numerically  insignificant  to begin  with; and Japan. That is,  with 
the exception  of Japan (and leaving aside the oil kingdoms),  all the rich 
countries today are European or derived from Europe. The rise of the 
West  is  a great theme  of  history  and a major puzzle.  In the Middle 
Ages,  the technological  prowess  and standards of living  of Europe did 
not much  impress  those  foreign  observers  who  left  a written record, 
such as traveling Arab merchants. On the contrary, medieval European 
travelers were often awed by what they saw in Asia,  as was Marco Polo 
in China. Why did Europe grow so rapidly relative to everywhere else? 
The most  immediate  answer is capitalism.  Yet  this raises  the further 
questions  of  how  capitalism  came  into being  and why  it took root so 
deeply  in Europe but not elsewhere. 
Capitalism elevates  to high status the concept  of cut-throat compe- 
tition  within  the  overall  framework  of  the  rules  of  the  game.  It  is 
perfectly  all right for a man to ruin his neighbor by competing  vigor- 
ously  in the marketplace-indeed,  he may become  a cultural hero- 
but it is illegal  to achieve  the same effect  with a gun or a knife.  While 
this system may seem natural to those who have grown up with it, it is 
far from natural to outsiders.  Capitalism encourages aggressive  warlike 
behaviors  within  the arena of  the private economic  sector (as demar- 
cated from on high,  sometimes  somewhat  arbitrarily) but at the same 
time attempts to strictly confine this aggressive  behavior and prevent it 
from spilling  over into any other sector of society.  The overall verdict 
of history is that this unlikely  sounding  combination  can make an in- 
credibly  productive  system,  more productive  than any other that has 
been tried. 
The capitalist  system  is a two-ring circus.  In ring one are the lions 
of capitalism-competitive,  aggressive,  mean-spirited.  In ring two are 
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gentler life.  The circus act is better when the lions are pumped-up and 
really hungry. But this sets up a tension,  because  the hungry lions  are 
not supposed to cross over the line drawn in the sand, separating them 
from the  lambs  resting  in ring two.  It is  an implausible,  potentially 
explosive,  contradictory situation when  a society  wants a ring full  of 
ferocious  lions  but expects  them not to transgress the weak and seem- 
ingly  artificial boundary on the circus floor. 
As to how such a peculiar and contradictory system came into being, 
I think it is no coincidence  that Europe and Japan share a feudal past, 
with castles,  knights in armor, tournaments, codes of chivalrous behav- 
ior,  and all  the other trappings.  For the purposes  of  this  discussion, 
feudalism  is a highly  ritualized system that, rather than outlawing  pri- 
vate armies and regional  warfare (as would  a centralized  despotism), 
evolves  elaborate rules of  the game that allow  such warfare but limit 
its potential for devastation  through strict taboos on particularly egre- 
gious  forms.  To take an example  from Japan, while almost all manner 
of cruelty was sanctioned  in feudal warfare, using  fire was forbidden, 
since otherwise the wooden buildings that were widespread in Japanese 
cities  and villages  at the time might be burned to the ground. European 
feudal codes  also tolerated unbelievably  cruel forms of private warfare, 
but they forbade attacks on women and children. These feudal systems 
did not appear particularly productive  when  contrasted with contem- 
porary oriental despotisms,  but they contained  the primitive  seeds  of 
an  idea  that was  destined  to  become  enormously  productive:  that a 
community might allow,  even encourage,  aggressively  competitive  be- 
havior,  provided that such behavior is kept within certain demarcated 
channels. 
The basic idea here is that feudalism served as a kind of kindergarten 
for  capitalism.  Without  such  an early  schooling,  it  is  difficult  for  a 
society  to grasp the essential  idea of  capitalism  and obtain the good 
kind of competition.  Lacking this basic training,  societies  tend either 
to veer off into mafia-like disregard of all boundaries-which  represents 
excessive  competitive  warfare-or  to succumb to excessive  centralized 
despotism  with  not enough  competitive  warfare.  It is hard to get  the 
right balance  by going  only  to grade school;  it helps  greatly  to have 
attended some preschool socializing  sessions,  where students learn how 
to play,  and fight,  by the rules. 
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sympathetic  with  the  aims  of  this  paper.  Like  the  first transition  to 
capitalism,  the post-Soviet  experience  shows  that the establishment  of 
good competition  is the single most important aspect of transition. But 
it also shows  that it is difficult to attain equilibrium with good compe- 
tition,  a task far transcending  in its challenge  the traditional supply- 
and-demand-type instruments in the standard toolkit of the economist. 
General  discussion:  Alberto Alesina  suggested that it would be useful 
to distinguish  between two types of vicious  circle that could expand or 
perpetuate the unofficial economy.  In an economic  circle,  high tax rates 
create  a large  unofficial  sector,  which  creates  low  tax revenues  and 
requires still  higher tax rates.  In a rule of  law  circle,  which  may be 
more damaging  in the long run, there is little rule of law to start with 
when the unofficial  sector emerges,  and the expansion of the unofficial 
sector adds to its acceptability,  further undermining the rule of law. He 
noted that an economic  circle  should be more susceptible  to narrowly 
economic  remedies,  such as lower tax rates.  Shleifer  replied that cul- 
tural entrenchment of tax avoidance did not seem to be a major problem. 
For example,  in several Latin American countries once tax codes  were 
simplified,  revenues  increased  dramatically.  However,  Alesina  noted 
that tax avoidance  varied considerably  even  across OECD economies 
and offered a rough estimate that Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio today would 
be only 60 to 80 percent rather than 120 percent if it had been enjoying 
the same tax compliance  as the United States. 
Alan Auerbach observed that if the adequacy of public goods deter- 
mines whether a country ends up at a good or a bad equilibrium,  and if 
tax resources  are currently too  limited  to achieve  adequacy,  then an 
appropriate policy response would be to borrow internationally in order 
to finance the level of public goods needed to keep the unofficial sector 
small.  Shleifer  replied  that not all  tax revenues  are used  in  socially 
beneficial  ways,  and funds from foreign borrowing presumably would 
not be either. Institutional reforms are needed to improve the provision 
of  law and order, to support financial markets,  and to reduce tax dis- 
incentives  in the official  sector. 
Olivier Blanchard raised questions about the model's  predictions for 
how the official  and unofficial  economies  would  evolve  over time.  If 
the evolution  depended on whether businesses  preferred mafia enforce- 
ment or government  enforcement-either  because  one was more pro- 236  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
ductive than the other or for other reasons-knowing  more about those 
preferences  would  be important for predicting or affecting  outcomes. 
He suspected that local firms might be content with mafia enforcement, 
whereas larger firms, and especially  foreign  firms, would  prefer gov- 
ernment enforcement.  In this case,  foreign direct investment might be 
key  to  the expansion  of  the official  sector.  Robert Hall  noted  that a 
number of previous studies had analyzed the importance of institutions 
and used the framework of good and bad equilibria. The standard find- 
ing  is that law-based,  above  ground economies  are more productive. 
He observed  that the empirical  work in this paper, which  found little 
difference in the performance of the official and unofficial sectors, stood 
in stark contrast with  these  other results.  Shleifer  responded that the 
paper's  inconclusive  findings  about relative  performance  in  the  two 
sectors  should  not  be  extrapolated  from  the  transition  economies  to 
more advanced economies.  There, he agreed, the evidence does suggest 
that a country benefits  from strong institutions  supporting the official 
economy. Simon  Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann,  and Andrei Shleifer  237 
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